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AbstrACt
Objectives To help people make decisions about the 
most effective mitigation measures against SARS- CoV- 2 
transmission in different scenarios, the likelihoods of 
transmission by different routes need to be quantified 
to some degree (however uncertain). These likelihoods 
need to be communicated in an appropriate way to 
illustrate the relative importance of different routes in 
different scenarios, the likely effectiveness of different 
mitigation measures along those routes, and the level of 
uncertainty in those estimates. In this study, a pragmatic 
expert elicitation was undertaken to supply the underlying 
quantitative values to produce such a communication tool.
Participants Twenty- seven individual experts from 
five countries and many scientific disciplines provided 
estimates.
Outcome measures Estimates of transmission 
parameters, assessments of the quality of the evidence, 
references to relevant literature, rationales for their 
estimates and sources of uncertainty.
results and conclusion The participants’ responses 
showed that there is still considerable disagreement 
among experts about the relative importance of different 
transmission pathways and the effectiveness of different 
mitigation measures due to a lack of empirical evidence. 
Despite these disagreements, when pooled, the majority 
views on each parameter formed an internally consistent 
set of estimates (for example, that transmission was more 
likely indoors than outdoors, and at closer range), which 
formed the basis of a visualisation to help individuals 
and organisations understand the factors that influence 
transmission and the potential benefits of different 
mitigation measures.
IntrOduCtIOn
Over 185 million cases of COVID- 19 have been 
recorded worldwide and 4 million people 
have died since the virus was first identified 
in December 2019. Highly effective vaccines 
hold great promise, but no vaccine provides 
100% protection from infection or illness, 
and so measures to reduce transmission of 
the SARS- CoV- 2 virus are likely to be required 
for the foreseeable future.
Reducing the spread of SARS- CoV- 2 
requires the adoption of effective behavioural 
and physical mitigation measures, such 
as wearing face coverings, hand washing, 
physical distancing, and increasing ventila-
tion in enclosed spaces. Therefore, individ-
uals, organisations and policy- makers need 
to appreciate the major routes by which 
the virus is transmitted in order to iden-
tify appropriate actions for any particular 
context, and suitable policies to support such 
measures. Attempts have been made to help 
decision- makers, including the public, under-
stand some of these routes through visual-
isations (eg, the visualisation by Salas and 
Almodóvar1), but the non- availability of data 
has, until now, made it almost impossible to 
illustrate comparative risks of transmission 
through different routes.
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This study provided sufficient quantitative data to 
underpin an interactive visualisation of the main 
transmission routes of SARS- CoV- 2, showing cur-
rent expert views on their relative importance in dif-
ferent scenarios, and the effectiveness of different 
possible mitigation measures.
 ► The results highlight differences in opinion among 
experts around several aspects of virus transmission 
and mitigation, and important evidence gaps.
 ► The study is limited in its participant pool, with some 
variable estimates only supplied by four experts, al-
though participants were sourced from a range of 
disciplines and countries.
 ► The study was carried out entirely online, and al-
though participants could contact the authors for 
further assistance, many found it difficult to quantify 
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Evidence to date suggests that transmission may occur 
through inhalation of aerosols when close to a person 
with infection or when further away (greater than 2 m), 
direct exposure to larger respiratory droplets when close 
to an infectious person, or contact with contaminated 
surfaces.2 Risk factors for transmission include spending 
time in highly occupied indoor spaces, particularly 
over long periods of time; activities that may generate 
a greater number of respiratory aerosols and droplets3; 
and poor ventilation.4 Infectious SARS- CoV- 2 is very 
hard to detect, especially when airborne and in real- life 
environments, and outbreak investigations inevitably 
happen after transmission has happened and evidence 
for the virus is no longer present. The empirical evidence 
base for the relative importance of transmission routes 
and the effects of different environments, activities and 
mitigation measures on the likelihood of transmitting 
SARS- CoV- 2 is therefore limited, meaning that systematic 
reviews of high quality empirical evidence are currently 
challenging. A number of systematic reviews have been 
conducted with a focus on transmission, but most of 
these reviews focus on the secondary attack rate and risk 
factors associated with particular settings rather than the 
mechanisms for transmission. A small number focus on 
elements relating to transmission mechanisms, including 
presence of the virus in the environment,5–7 individual 
modes of transmission,8 9 and influence of some envi-
ronmental mitigation measures such as distancing and 
masks.10 11 However, data are currently insufficient to 
combine information on transmission routes together 
in a conclusive systematic review, and to our knowledge 
only one study has identified sufficient data to draw quan-
titative conclusions around transmission and mitigation 
through a meta- analysis approach.10 It will probably be 
some time before the evidence base is large enough to 
provide precise answers to many important questions 
about virus transmission under the variety of conditions 
encountered in the real world. Decision- makers are there-
fore in a difficult position as they need to make decisions 
about mitigation measures before such an evidence base 
can be established. However, there is a body of knowl-
edge, including narrowly focused systematic reviews, that 
encompasses clinical trials, theoretical understanding 
and observational data. Therefore, it may be possible to 
synthesise sufficient knowledge from a diverse range of 
experts to be able to make order of magnitude judge-
ments on the factors that influence transmission. While 
more detailed evidence would be desirable, this level of 
understanding may well be adequate to support decisions 
on mitigation measures that do not require precise quan-
tification of every variable in the system, and indeed these 
decisions need to be taken even in the absence of such 
information.
We describe a two- stage, pragmatic expert elicitation 
designed to provide information that could form the basis 
for communicating information on SARS- CoV- 2 trans-
mission through visualisations, including suitable repre-
sentations of uncertainty. To our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to assimilate the necessary information to 
create such a visualisation. The project has three aspects: 
constructing a framework to represent possible viral 
transmission pathways and mitigation strategies; eliciting 
quantitative estimates of viral dispersion and exposure 
from experts; and creating a visualisation of the transmis-
sion pathways which communicates the state of knowl-
edge in an intuitive enough way to allow it to be useful 
to members of the public and policy- makers. We describe 
the first two elements of the process; the visualisation is 
described in an accompanying manuscript and interactive 
graphic.12 The study was led by members of a subgroup of 
the UK Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies Envi-
ronment and Modelling Group (SAGE- EMG).13
MethOds
Patient and public involvement
Patients and the public were not involved in the design or 
conduct of this expert elicitation. The visualisation that 
the elicitation underlies is intended for public use and 
dissemination, and was user- tested with members of the 
public during its design by the Winton Centre for Risk & 
Evidence Communication.
stage 1: constructing a conceptual transmission framework
Our first step was to construct a conceptual framework 
(figure 1) intended to represent current evidence on the 
potential major pathways of transmission of SARS- CoV- 2 
and where mitigation measures might disrupt the trans-
mission routes in a clear and comprehensible way whilst 
also containing sufficient detail to explore the possible 
effects of different environments and activities. The 
potential infection routes via urine, faeces and sexual 
transmission were considered but since none has been 
confirmed in humans, they were not considered worth 
including at this point.
This framework was specifically constructed to represent 
transfer from one infectious person to another suscep-
tible individual, and therefore did not include factors 
that would affect infection risk at a population level, such 
as prevalence of the virus or the number of people within 
a given scenario. The framework was proposed with the 
intention that the amount of virus transferred along each 
route could be used as the basis for visualising the rela-
tive importance of each route and the effect of different 
scenarios and different mitigation measures. See online 
supplemental information 1 for more details on the 
quantitative basis for the planned visualisation.
This framework provided a basis for the elicitation, 
guiding the information that would need to be elicited 
to create a semi- quantitative visualisation of the relative 
importance of different possible transmission pathways, 
and the effects of different mitigation measures. We 
sought quantitative information on:
1. The relative rates of virus production by a person with 
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Figure 1 Main known transmission pathways for SARS- CoV- 2 from a person with infection to a susceptible person, and 
potential mitigation measures (in green) that might affect each pathway.
2. The split at each node to estimate the relative amount 
of infectious virus likely to be transferred along each 
pathway (eg, the ‘percentage of infectious virus’ like-
ly to be transferred to the environment in aerosol vs 
small droplet fractions of exhaled air).
3. How or whether the splits would be affected by differ-
ent environments or activities, including mitigation 
measures (eg, whether the wearing of a face covering 
by an infectious person would affect the percentage of 
infectious virus likely to be transferred to the environ-
ment in aerosol vs small droplet fractions of exhaled 
air).
4. The loss to the environment of the infectious virus 
along each pathway, under different environmental 
conditions or activities, including mitigation measures 
(eg, the percentage transfer of infectious virus pro-
duced in large respiratory droplets to a susceptible per-
son’s mucous membranes—depending on how close 
the two people are standing, for how long and whether 
there are any barriers between them such as screens).
The true number of possible factors affecting each 
of these variables is unknown, and would be impracti-
cably large, so subjective decisions were made to reduce 
the number of factors to a manageable level while also 
producing a useful set of options for those needing to 
make risk management decisions.
Our approach resulted in an initial list of 123 numerical 
variables to be elicited (see online supplemental informa-
tion 2), but there were also outstanding questions over 
whether there were additional variables not anticipated 
at this stage, and also some questions (eg, time spent in 
a shared environment) where we asked participants how 
best to treat the variable. Therefore, the first round of the 
expert elicitation protocol was designed to help identify 
which activities and environments should be considered, 
as well as eliciting estimates for the initial list of variables.
stage 2: eliciting estimates
Expert elicitations are often used as a way of providing 
‘best estimates’ when the factors that need to be taken 
into consideration—and the uncertainties associated 
with them—are so complex as to go beyond what can be 
simulated, modelled or empirically tested.14–16 Such elici-
tations have been used in fields from health to economics 
to climate change policy, where empirical data are lacking 
and uncertainty is high.17–22
The need for approximate, relative values for key 
parameters for disease transmission pathways is an excel-
lent example of where expert elicitation is helpful. The 
uncertainty involved in the estimates is mostly because 
of a lack of knowledge rather than the play of chance; 
in other words, epistemic rather than aleatory uncertainty 
(although of course the estimates themselves are prob-
abilistic, incorporating the aleatory component). There 
is also considerable variability in transmission or mitiga-
tion dependent on an almost infinite variety of factors 
(such as the behaviour of the individuals concerned, the 
precise environmental conditions of the encounter etc). 
Capturing the degree of expected variability per scenario 
in the real world is very important if the information is 
to be truly informative to decision- makers, who need to 
know ‘best case’ and ‘worst case’ likely estimates as much 
as the average. Some empirical evidence for factors that 
affect transmission is available from a range of different 
sources (modelling, laboratory experiments, epidemi-
ological and observational data),23 but with significant 
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gaps, especially when it comes to real- world environ-
ments. All of the above considerations make it impos-
sible to determine estimates based purely on published 
literature, but there is a reasonable expert understanding 
of the key processes involved in each part of the trans-
mission pathways, although again with some gaps.24–27 By 
bringing together a range of experts, and encouraging 
them to consider the real- world variability as well as epis-
temic and aleatory uncertainty that will create a range 
around any estimated values, it is possible to obtain more 
realistic ranges for such estimates than could be gained 
through any single modelling exercise or experiment 
(should that even be possible).
The key elements of successful expert elicitation 
include28–30:
 ► A considered selection of experts to give a well 
rounded set of opinions.
 ► Making sure that the questions are phrased in such 
a way as to be not easily misinterpreted or too vague.
 ► Ensuring that the questions help participants produce 
a subjective quantitative estimate by eliciting values 
that they are likely to have already considered in a 
quantitative way if possible.
 ► Helping participants consider all the evidence avail-
able to them and alternative viewpoints.
 ► Counteracting the cognitive heuristics and biases that 
are known to operate, particularly when it comes to 
framing, and confidence in answers and ranges.
 ► Encouraging the experts to consider and capture 
the full range of uncertainties in the estimates (both 
direct, through quantitative ranges, and indirect—
issues with confidence in the underlying evidence or 
expert disagreement), and also expected ranges of 
the estimates due to variability in the scenarios in the 
real world.
Our elicitation process was designed to arrive at ranges 
rather than a single consensus estimate, and to allow for 
differing opinions. We were also particularly conscious of 
the possibilities for groupthink, or dominance by certain 
personalities or specialties. We therefore chose to avoid 
protocols that relied on behavioural aggregation methods, 
where discussion takes part between experts and they 
are encouraged to converge on a consensus answer. The 
process was also necessarily online only. However, to help 
participants consider the full range of evidence and opin-
ions from others, two rounds were used, with participants 
in the second round shown the estimates of participants 
in the first round and a summary of considerations, refer-
ences and rationales that were given by participants in the 
first round (in anonymised form). Unlike the IDEA elici-
tation framework,29 however, which also employs a similar 
information- sharing stage, there was no opportunity for 
discussion or conferral between the rounds to avoid any 
psychological effects during discussion. Unlike the Cooke 
protocol,31 there were no seed questions and weighting 
of expert responses during mathematical aggregation. 
This was partly to reduce the question burden on partici-
pants (given the large number of variables being elicited) 
and because of the difficulty of providing suitable seed 
questions with known answers in a relevant field, espe-
cially given the broad range of participants’ experiences. 
Perhaps more importantly, we also wanted to avoid 
allowing some ‘experts’ to dominate the outputs in such 
a public study, in contrast to an ‘internal’ analysis where 
pure accuracy might be more important. The two rounds 
were also designed to balance out some known biases, as 
described below.
The first round solicited initial estimated ranges rather 
than point estimates for each variable. No background 
information was provided to respondents to avoid biasing 
results by suggesting numbers on which the participants 
could anchor, or evidence that might narrow their thought 
processes to a particular source of data or scenarios.30 32 
However, overconfidence when estimating is a universal 
phenomenon and these ranges are likely to be narrower 
than justified by the evidence.32
The second round, with a larger sample size and 
broader range of invited experts, collated the estimates 
as well as the references and rationales provided by the 
first round in order to elicit participants’ estimations of 
the likelihood of the true range of values falling below, 
within or above the average range provided by partici-
pants in the first round. This strategy aimed to encourage 
participants to consider opinions and evidence that they 
may not have thought of or been aware of at first, and to 
counteract framing effects.
The study gained ethical approval from the University 
of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
(PRE.20210006), and the method was pre- registered 
(https:// osf. io/ rd69j). Full questionnaires and data are 
available online (https:// osf. io/ 8269v/).
round 1: methods
An initial set of experts was collated from recommenda-
tions from members of SAGE- EMG. The aim was to obtain 
broad coverage of expertise and a range of likely opin-
ions. At the end of the elicitation survey, each participant 
was asked to nominate others whom they felt should be 
invited to participate. Additional experts were reviewed 
by the authors and invited to participate if they had not 
already been. Participants were asked to give their broad 
area of expertise and their country of residence so that 
further recruitment could address issues of diversity of 
experience and opinion. The number of participants 
asked was intentionally limited as this round was to gain 
initial estimates and references, and a sense of the extent 
of agreement or disagreement among experts, while 
leaving a large enough pool of experts for the second 
round.
The process was designed to be carried out entirely 
online using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT, USA). 
Prompts to assist experts in thinking through their esti-
mates were included in the survey design.
Participants were first able to select which of the trans-
mission pathways they considered relevant to their exper-
tise in order to minimise and focus the questions they 
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Figure 2 Division of the transmission diagram into different pathways to allow participants to select those that reflected their 
expertise.
were asked (figure 2). On the basis of their selection they 
were then shown the relevant section or sections of the 
transmission diagram and asked the following:
1. To give a quantitative estimate in the form of their 95% 
subjective probability interval for the particular val-
ue in question (including both variability due to the 
range of possible scenarios as well as uncertainty).
2. To select whether their estimate was based on empir-
ical or modelling evidence or is purely expert opinion.
3. If they stated that it was based on evidence, to state ref-
erences for that evidence. If they stated that it was based 
on evidence, to give a rating of the quality of that under-
lying evidence (on a scale from 1 to 5 with the extremes 
marked ‘Low confidence that the findings would hold 
true in reality’ and ‘High confidence that the findings 
would hold true in reality’).
4. To briefly explain their rationale for their estimates.
5. To outline the key assumptions or considerations that 
would significantly affect their answer, and whether 
there is evidence or reliable modelling that would 
inform how their answer would change in relation to 
those variables.
It was hoped that prompting them to list and rate the 
evidence, to give their rationale, and to consider their 
key assumptions would help participants broaden their 
estimated ranges by considering the variability and uncer-
tainties more deeply. At all times participants were able to 
see their estimates to previous questions and alter them.
They were also given the opportunity to add other miti-
gations or activities that they thought should be consid-
ered as part of the elicitation process.
Round 1 was completed between 7 and 28 February 
2021.
round 1: results
Out of fourteen participants invited to take part in round 
1, 11 completed at least one pathway section of the survey. 
Participants were from the UK, the USA and Australia, 
and described their expertise as coming from medicine 
(1), engineering (4), biology (2), chemistry (1), epide-
miology (1), physics (1) and occupational and environ-
mental health (1). Participants who declined to take part 
in round 1 were from the UK and Hong Kong.
Forest plots were created for each participant’s esti-
mated range for each of the 123 variables elicited (see 
online supplemental information 3). We examined the 
distribution of participants’ estimates for each variable 
and their rationales. This was a subjective judgement 
based on the distributions (eg, whether there were ranges 
that showed no overlap) and the rationales given.
Some estimates appeared to form a unimodal distribu-
tion, however in some cases it was clear that there were 
differences in participants’ understanding about the 
underlying processes, giving rise to very different ‘camps’ 
in the estimates. Most of this disagreement related to the 
proportion of infectious virus spread via aerosols versus 
larger particles in exhaled air (figure 3). This difference 
in participants’ underlying conceptual models for virus 
transmission carried through for most of the variables 
associated with the airborne pathways, including the 
effects of potential mitigation measures such as face masks 
or ventilation. There were also disparities in how highly 
participants rated the quality of the empirical evidence 
underlying their estimates on the proportional split of 
the virus between different particle sizes. On a five- point 
scale, two participants rated the evidence strength at ‘2’ 
and two at ‘5’, and one participant stated that there was 
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Figure 4 Example of an 'average distribution' from three 
participants in round 1 (blue) and the 70% confidence 
interval extracted from that to be displayed to participants in 
round 2 (green). In this example, the variable elicited is the 
percentage loss of infectious virus during transmission from a 
susceptible person’s hand to their mucous membranes (given 
no mitigations in place).
Figure 3 Example of elicited responses to a variable 
where participants fell into three 'camps': estimates of 
the proportion of infectious virus emitted via (A) aerosols 
(<10 μm), (B) small particles (10–100 μm), and (C) large 
particles (>100 μm) in the exhaled breath from a person 
infected with SARS- CoV- 2 who was not talking. Checking 
the free text rationales indicated that some thought that 
transmission occurred almost entirely through larger 
particles, some almost exclusively by aerosols, and some 
that it is more evenly spread across all three sizes of particle. 
Many mentioned the uncertainties caused by problems 
in measuring the virus. Numbers on right hand axis show 
individual responses.
no empirical evidence underlying their estimates (the 
remaining two participants rated the evidence quality as 
‘3’ and ‘4’).
Two other variables split into different ‘camps’: the 
effect of gloves on transmission via touch, and the effect 
of a scenario involving handling shared objects such as 
plates at a shared meal.
Participants otherwise tended to give similar rationales 
for their estimates, and gave citations for references they 
had used when producing their estimates; these were 
often quite different from one participant to another. 
Some participants gave ranges of ‘0% to 100%’ and stated 
in their rationales that this was because sometimes people 
would ‘be lucky’ and sometimes ‘unlucky’ and transmis-
sion would either occur or not occur (demonstrating 
discomfort with probabilistic thinking). Some also indi-
cated that they were not clear how much variation within 
each possible scenario (eg, behavioural variation in a situ-
ation) should be taken into account in their uncertainty 
ranges. Some explained they were citing 95% confidence 
intervals from empirical studies (rather than taking 
deeper uncertainties into consideration in their ranges).
Participants additionally suggested a few more variables 
to elicit, where they raised potential mitigations (such as 
hand hygiene) that had not been part of the survey in 
round 1.
round 2: methods
Taking the results from participants in round 1, a new 
survey form using Qualtrics software was created. Partic-
ipants in round 2 were shown the ‘average range’ for 
each variable elicited in round 1, and asked how likely 
they thought it that the actual percentage would fall 
below, within or above that range. To support them in 
making a judgement they were also shown a forest plot 
of the individual responses, a summary of the rationales 
and assumptions of participants in round 1, and a hyper-
linked collation of all the references that round 1 partic-
ipants had given.
Preparing the ranges to be shown to participants
For variables where the estimates from participants 
in round 1 formed a unimodal distribution they were 
combined. The lower and upper bounds of the estimate 
elicited from each participant were assumed to form 95% 
intervals of an underlying normal distribution. We could 
in principle have fitted some three- parameter family of 
distributions that allowed skewness, but this additional 
complexity did not seem justified at this first stage when 
we were deliberately focusing on the ranges rather than 
the point estimates. Individual normal distributions 
were fitted to these bounds, and the fitted densities then 
averaged to form an unweighted linear opinion pool.33 
From this combined distribution, an interval was taken 
to present to participants in round 2. The choice of the 
intervals to be presented is essentially arbitrary, as it is 
merely a means to help elicit each participant’s subjective 
probability distribution, but such intervals become less 
informative if they are too wide or too narrow (ie, too 
likely that at least one of the estimated likelihoods—of 
falling within, above or below the range—would be zero). 
Although we had pre- registered to take a 95% confi-
dence interval, we chose to change this to a 70% interval 
given the breadth of many of the combined distributions, 
which would have made a 95% interval too broad to give 
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Figure 5 Participants’ estimates of the percentage increase that each of a range of different activities would cause in 
exhalation of infectious virus by an infected person: (A) speaking, (B) speaking loudly, (C) coughing, (D) singing, (E) exercising, 
(F) eating and (G) infected with a variant of concern. In each case, the top graph shows individual estimates, the middle graph 
the average of those estimates, and the bottom graph a cumulative probability distribution, with (in green) the median and 
interquartile range. Values in parentheses to the right show each participant’s estimate of the percentage likelihood of the true 
value lying below, within and above the range identified in round 1, shown by the orange lines. Values in parentheses in the 
bottom graph show 25th, 50th and 75th percentile estimates from the combined responses. The vertical dashed line shows the 
100% reference case (that is, no different from silent breathing).
informative responses from participants in round 2. For 
example, see figure 4.
Where participants’ estimates did not form a unimodal 
distribution, the estimates from round 1 were grouped 
into different ‘camps’ to reflect the bimodal or multi-
modal distribution. Each of these camps was then treated 
as above—the estimated ranges combined and a 70% 
confidence interval extracted from each.
Design of the questionnaire
Taking into account some of the difficulties in 
responding expressed by participants in round 1, we 
 on D
ecem









pen: first published as 10.1136/bm






8 Freeman ALJ, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e050869. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869
Open access 
Table 1 Summary of participants’ estimates of the effects of different activities on the amount of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 virus 
produced by individuals (n=7 for each estimate)
Activity
Estimated percentage relative difference 
from silent breathing (50% CI)
Mean quality of evidence 
rating (1–5) (round 2)
References given 
(across both rounds)
Speaking 404 (222 to 640) 3.0 51–56
Speaking loudly 600 (358 to 1112) 3.0 51–58
Coughing 1400 (776 to 2410) 3.0 51 53–66
Singing 820 (542 to 1242) 3.0 4 51 53–58 67–71
Exercising 522 (264 to 1014) 2.3 56 72 73
Eating 154 (84 to 239) 2.4 52
Infected with a new 
variant of concern
143 (101 to 190) 2.3 74 75
Table 2 Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 produced by an infected person that would be 




Estimated percentage of virus emitted, median (50% 
range)












6 out of 7 79 (68–90) 6 (4–9) 3 (1–5) 3.3 52 54 55 63 70 76–80
1 out of 7 37 (18–41) 58 (37–79) 25 (18–46)
Speaking 1 out of 6 86 (83–90) 11 (9–13) 5 (4–5) 2.8 26 55 63 70 76 77
5 out of 6 31 (22–39) 32 (25–50) 46 (29–63)
Speaking 
loudly
1 out of 5 86 (83–89) 11 (9–13) 5 (4–5) 2.8 26 52 55 57 63 70 76 77 81 82
3 out of 5 31 (21–42) 29 (22–40) 45 (26–64)
1 out of 5 3 (1–41) 11 (5–41) 92 (88–96)
Coughing 3 out of 5 35 (28–66) 33 (26–55) 45 (23–68) 3.3 51–62 64 82
2 out of 5 5 (2–34) 18 (8–57) 88 (82–95)
Singing 1 out of 5 88 (86–90) 8 (6–10) 5 (4–5) 2.8 26 52 55 57 63 70 77 81–83
3 out of 5 31 (21–42) 29 (21–37) 44 (24–64)
1 out of 5 2 (1–3) 10 (5–34) 92 (88–96)
Exercising 1 out of 5 91 (86–96) 9 (5–13) 6 (3–8) 2.6
3 out of 5 34 (24–54) 30 (23–45) 44 (24–64)
1 out of 5 0.6 (0.4–0.8) 12 (8–15) 91 (88–95)
Eating 3 out of 5 97 (96–98) 4 (3–28) 0.6 (0.4–19) 2.4
1 out of 5 31 (25–37) 29 (25–34) 44
(32–566)
1 out of 5 0.8 (0.4–50) 11 (4–36) 92 (86–96)
Estimates not normalised to sum 100%.
Separate lines are used for groups of participants who fell into distinctly different camps of opinion.
added an introductory section with more detailed 
guidance on how to interpret the questions asked. 
To help participants take into account variability in 
the scenarios and uncertainty around them, and to 
turn this into a probabilistic range, we suggested that 
participants sometimes thought in terms of expected 
frequencies rather than probabilities. This section was 
also explicit about the need to take into account vari-
ability in the scenario as well as uncertainty around 
an estimate under one set of conditions. (Text used: 
‘Sometimes it’s harder to think about scenarios in terms 
of probabilities. For example, if you’re talking about 
the likelihood of infection from a ballistic droplet from 
an infected person hitting another person directly in 
the eye or mouth it can be tempting to think that the 
probability can range from 0% to 100% according to 
chance. However, if you think about 100 such encoun-
ters between an infected person and a susceptible 
person what we’re asking is how many times out of 
those 100 you would expect the susceptible person 
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Table 3 Participants' estimates of the effects of different source control mitigations taken by an infected person on the 
emission of SARS- CoV- 2 virus into the environment through three different fractions of their exhaled air
Mitigation
(infected person)







rounds)Aerosols Small droplets Large droplets
Home- made cotton face 
covering
24 (16–37) 54 (30–61) 77 (66–85) 2.8 80 84–88
‘Surgical’ face mask 68 (45–75) 72 (60–75) 82 (65–85) 3.5 80 84–89
FFP3 or similar face mask 92 (90–93) 93 (92–95) 95 (93–97) 3.7
Plastic face visor 7 (5–13) 20 (14–43) 37 (27–77) 3.0 85
Table 4 Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious virus lost to the environment when travelling via aerosols or 
small droplets in different environments (susceptible person and infected person 2m apart)
Environment
(2m apart) No per group
Estimated percentage loss of virus 
transmitted, median (50% range)







rounds)via Aerosols via Small droplets
Small, unventilated room 3 out of 7 49 (43–54) 55 (47–63) 3.0 90–97
4 out of 7 16 (6–29) 16 (9–23)
Small, ventilated room 6 out of 6 87 (76–96) 85 (67–90)* 3.0 91–99
50 (31–69)*
Large, unventilated room 1 out of 6 78 (69–88) 85 (42–91) 3.0 90–99
2 out of 6 50 (31–69) 21 (14–27)
3 out of 6 26 (20–33) 52 (37–67)
Large, ventilated room 6 out of 6 82 (74–91) 82 (74–90)† 3.0 90–100
Outdoors 6 out of 6 88 (78–97) 81 (70–91) 3.3
*Five participants estimated the higher value for small droplets, one participant estimated the lower value.
†One participant did not provide an answer for small droplets so n=5 in this instance.
to be ‘unlucky’ and get hit by such a droplet, given 
all the variations in the scenario described that might 
happen, and we’re asking you to give us that number 
as a range, to encompass the degree of uncertainty 
around it (due both to lack of knowledge and about 
the potential variability in the scenario)’).
As in round 1, participants were first able to select which 
of the transmission pathways they considered their exper-
tise to be in, and were then shown the relevant section or 
sections of the transmission diagram. For each variable 
that was elicited in round 1, participants in round 2 were 
shown the forest plot of these estimates, an outline of the 
rationales and assumptions listed by participants in round 
1, and a list of the references that they had given (with 
links to papers provided).
Where participants in round 1 had fallen into more 
than one camp in their estimates, participants in round 
2 were asked initially which camp they fell into. They 
were then shown the relevant 70% average range from 
the participants in round 1 and asked the following:
1. To move sliders (with a forced sum of 100%) to show 
‘Considering all the uncertainties and possible true val-
ues in the real world, in what percentage of scenarios like 
this would you expect the true value to fall below, within, or 
above this range?’
2. To give any additional references to support their esti-
mates.
3. To provide a rating of the quality of the underlying evi-
dence (on a scale from 1 to 5 with the extremes marked 
‘Low confidence that the findings would hold true in 
reality’ and ‘High confidence that the findings would 
hold true in reality’).
4. To outline the key assumptions or considerations that 
would significantly affect their answer, and whether 
there is evidence or reliable modelling that would 
inform how their answer would change in relation to 
those variables.
For new variables, not previously elicited in round 1, 
the question format was the same as in round 1, eliciting 
percentage ranges de novo.
Participants invited to take part in round 1 were invited 
to take part in round 2 as well, along with others selected 
initially by members of SAGE- EMG and then by subse-
quent snowball sampling from suggestions by partici-
pants. Participants were chosen from as many different 
geographical regions as possible, within the time 
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Table 5 Participants' estimates on the percentage of infectious virus lost to the environment if two individuals were standing 




Further apart than 2m: estimated 
percentage loss of virus 
transmitted, median (50% range)
No per 
group
Closer than 2m: estimated 
percentage loss of virus 










5 out of 5 40 (18–66) 5 out of 5 18 (7–42) 96 97 101
3 out of 4 70 (42–87) 3 out of 4 68 (61–74)
1 out of 4 52 (28–76) 1 out of 4 25 (17–34)
Small, 
ventilated room
5 out of 5 66 (51–81) 5 out of 5 42 (24–54)
3 out of 4 78 (54–88) 3 out of 4 69 (50–78)




5 out of 5 61 (47–74) 5 out of 5 40 (20–56)
3 out of 4 73 (54–86) 3 out of 4 15 (12–43)
1 out of 4 28 (4–64) 1 out of 4 53 (34–69)
Large, 
ventilated room
5 out of 5 78 (69–86) 5 out of 5 49 (32–60)
3 out of 4 93 (72–95) 2 out of 4 75 (66–84)
1 out of 4 48 (22–74) 2 out of 4 14 (11–53)
Outdoors 5 out of 5 93 (89–97) 5 out of 5 73 (60–85)
4 out of 4 93 (90–95) 3 out of 4 80 (67–94)
1 out of 4 27 (22–50)
available, and to represent a range of different expertises. 
The aim was to maximise the diversity of relevant opin-
ions, through their knowledge, experience and access 
to different sources of evidence. The same demographic 
information was collected from participants as in round 
1.
Round 2 was completed by participants between 15 
March and 4 May 2021.
summary: round 2
For round 2, 68 participants were individually invited, 
including all participants from round 1, a range of scien-
tific experts who have published in relevant areas, and 
representatives from SAGE, WHO, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), and European Centre 
for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) committees. 
From this pool, 23 participants submitted at least some 
data. Geographically there were participants from the 
UK (19), the USA (2), Singapore (1) and Thailand (1). 
Several participants, including some from other coun-
tries, started the questionnaire but did not contribute 
estimates. Participants who declined to take part or who 
did not contribute estimates were from Australia, Hong 
Kong, the USA, Canada, Italy, Taiwan, Norway, Germany 
and Singapore. Expertise represented included engi-
neering (7), medicine (5), chemistry (2), virology/
infection control (2), epidemiology (2), aerobiology (1), 
microbiology (2), social and environmental change (1) 
and mathematical modelling (1). Seven of the partici-
pants in round 2 had taken part in round 1, while 16 were 
new participants.
Participants’ estimates for the variables that were elic-
ited for the first time in round 2 were treated in the same 
way as those elicited in round 1, resulting in average 
distributions.
Where participants’ answers were bounded by having 
to fall within 0%–100%, their estimates of the likelihood 
of a variable’s ‘true value’ lying below, within, and above 
the indicated range were treated as if they summarised a 
constant distribution within each of those three areas of 
the 0%–100% scale. Where they were just bounded below 
by 0 (pathway 1; see figure 2), their underlying beliefs 
were assumed to form a log- normal distribution; this was 
obtained by fitting a normal distribution on a logarithmic 
scale.
In some cases, where there had previously been two 
or more ‘camps’ of participants in round 1, with their 
responses falling into bimodal or trimodal distributions, 
the number of alternative viewpoints decreased. Where 
participants chose different ‘camps’ on the basis of an 
initial question but their answers showed that their views 
were not incompatible with each other (eg, where partic-
ipants who thought that a value was likely below 50% but 
their percentages indicated it was near 50%, they were 
combined with those who had stated that they believed a 
value was above 50% but whose probability distributions 
indicated that there was also some likelihood of it being 
below 50%). In many cases large amounts of disagree-
ment remained between participants, and sometimes 
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Table 6 Participants' estimates of the effects of different mitigations taken by a susceptible person on the potential 
prevention of infectious SARS- CoV2 inhaled via two different fractions of infected exhaled air
Mitigation
(susceptible person) No per group
Estimated percentage loss of virus, 
median (50% range)






rounds)via Aerosols via Small droplets
Home- made cotton 
face covering
4 out of 4 78 (68–87) 3.5 86–88 102–104
3 out of 4 18 (8–28)
1 out of 4 52 (41–64)
‘Surgical’ face mask 4 out of 4 84 (76–91) 3.5 86–88 102–104
3 out of 4 60 (52–68)
1 out of 4 27 (13–61)
FFP3 or similar face 
mask
3 out of 3 93 (83–99) 3.5 85 105
4 out of 4 94 (89–98)
Plastic face visor 4 out of 4 5 (3–7) 4 (2–6) 3.8 85 106
Being behind a 
perspex screen
4 out of 4 17 (6–27) 3.3 46 47
3 out of 4 46 (19–73)
1 out of 4 81 (77–85)
Table 7 Participants' pooled estimates on the percentage of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 likely transmitted through different 
routes from large droplets (>100 μm) (n=6 for each estimate)
Scenario
















Same room, no direct 
contact
49 (33–70) 44 (27–61) 2 (1–5) 27 (8–45) 3.5 93 107 108
Sharing table, limited 
shared contact
44 (25–68) 74 (53–87) 9 (4–14) 24 (2–45) 3.7 57 109–111
Regular contact with 
shared items
40 (19–63) 59 (39–79) 12 (4–22) 26 (7–45) 3.3
Regular direct 
contact
38 (17–62) 37 (20–63) 18 (7–31) 23 (2–44) 3.3
Estimates not normalised to sum 100%.
A mean was taken of participants’ estimates of the 
quality of the underlying evidence for each variable as 
given in round 2.
results
Pathway 1: factors that affect the amount of virus exhaled by 
an infected person
Participants were asked to give their estimate of the 
percentage relative difference in infectious virus produced 
by someone with normal respiratory rate during a range 
of activities in comparison to silent breathing (this was 
considered to be 100%). This included speaking at 
average volume (ie, not projecting their voice); speaking 
loudly such as in a classroom, theatre or lecture; coughing; 
singing, exercising, eating; infected with a new variant of 
concern (at this point, the main variant of concern being 
considered was the alpha variant). Seven participants 
contributed estimates in round 2; participants’ individual 
and collated responses are summarised in figure 5 and 
in table 1, with additional data in online supplemental 
materials 3. The ranges shown in each case encompass 
participants’ estimates of the uncertainties and the range 
of variability due to environmental and individual factors.
Most participants made the assumption that the pattern 
of infectious virus emission follows that of particle emis-
sions because we cannot directly measure the amount of 
infectious virus. However, some specifically mentioned 
that studies with measurements of ‘microbial’ (not viral 
or SARS- CoV- 2) concentrations in respiratory output may 
not necessarily mirror the pattern of all particle emissions.
Other factors that participants suggested might affect 
the amount or distribution of infectious virus produced 
included the individual’s age (with children potentially 
being lower emitters34), sex (men potentially emitting 
 on D
ecem









pen: first published as 10.1136/bm






12 Freeman ALJ, et al. BMJ Open 2021;11:e050869. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869
Open access 
Table 8 Participants' pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of transfer of infectious virus along different paths 





















Well ventilated space 6 7 (3–26) 19 (5–39) 19 (5–32) 3.5   
Outdoors 5 8 (3–15) 10 (4–15) 7 (2–14) 3.4   
Face covering 5 77 (71–84) 85 (71–90) 86 (41–93) 4.5 112
Perspex screen 4 8 (4–28) 42 (26–48) 57 (31–77)   
Good respiratory hygiene 4 58 (31–73) 58 (37–76) 49 (36–61)   
Gloves 5 62 (3–76) 27 (1–40) 31 (3–42)   
Staying in space half as long 3 23 (14–44) 44 (18–51) 45 (41–49) 113 114
higher levels of virus), stage of infection (eg, whether they 
were symptomatic or not), smoking status (with smokers 
emitting higher levels) or use of snuff and possible other 
nicotine delivery systems, immune status (with those 
on immunosuppressive drugs or with reduced immune 
systems producing higher levels, as well as potentially 
those with respiratory allergies), and potentially co- infec-
tion with other micro- organisms or certain treatments, 
such as antivirals.
Participants noted that individual differences in speech 
such as style and language (eg, the amount of ‘plosive’ 
consonants), loudness and moistness of mouth were all 
likely to affect projection of infectious virus. Similarly 
wetter and more ‘productive’ coughs, with copious naso-
pharyngeal secretions, were thought more likely to have 
higher infectious components. With the estimates on 
emission during singing and exercise, participants often 
mentioned that they were particularly influenced by the 
studies of real- world ‘superspreader’ events which they 
felt were more reliable indicators of infectiousness than 
laboratory studies.
Participants highlighted little evidence for the amount 
of virus produced while eating, but mentioned reasons 
for believing that there might be either a potential 
decrease in time spent with mouth open, or that respiratory 
fluids were soaked into food and swallowed; or an increase 
in time spent with mouth open, increased salivation, 
mechanical movements of the jaw and tongue or people 
clearing their throats.
When asked about the effects of infection by any of 
the current variants of concern, participants commented 
that there was not good evidence of higher viral load or 
viral shedding in these variants and that their increased 
infectivity could be due to a greater ability of the virus 
to evade an antibody response as much as through 
increased production of viral particles. It should be noted 
that during round 1, this was mainly the alpha variant 
B117. During round 2, there were several known variants 
of concern with apparent higher transmissibility, but the 
survey was completed before the delta variant became 
widespread.
Pathway 2: factors that affect the amount of virus emitted to 
the environment in respiratory output
Size distribution of viral emissions: Respiratory output 
from individuals contains a spectrum of wet aerosol 
and droplet sizes, each of which might behave in a 
different way in terms of persistence in an environ-
ment and response to different mitigations. Partici-
pants were therefore first asked their opinions about 
how much of the virus exhaled by an infected person 
(taken as a baseline 100%) might be contained within 
each of three broad fractions: path A (aerosols <10 μm 
in diameter), path B (small droplets, 10–100 μm) and 
path C (large droplets, over 100 μm). Participants were 
asked this for an individual who was silent and respiring 
normally, but also for an individual performing each of 
the activities outlined in pathway 1 above. Six partic-
ipants contributed data in this pathway, with data 
summarised in table 2 and online supplemental infor-
mation 4. Again, the ranges given encompass partici-
pants’ estimates of both the uncertainty and variation 
due to environmental and individual factors inherent 
in each scenario described.
As in round 1, participants were divided on the degree 
to which they felt the viral particles were predominantly 
carried in the fraction of the respiratory output falling 
under the definition of ‘aerosols’. For silent breathing, 
six out of seven participants suggested that virus may 
be predominantly in aerosols, for speaking at normal 
volume, five out of six participants thought that the virus 
would likely be spread fairly evenly across the different 
fraction sizes. For the other activities there was further 
disagreement among the experts, highlighting a substan-
tial gap in knowledge.
Similar to pathway 1, participants discussed the chal-
lenges of detecting virus particles in the air, and that a 
lot of studies assume that virus is distributed evenly across 
different respiratory particle sizes by volume. There was 
also discussion on whether people with symptomatic infec-
tion would produce a different distribution of particle 
sizes due to stress, fever and respiratory symptoms.
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Table 9 Participants' pooled estimates on the percentage of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 likely transmitted from a contaminated 
hand to surrounding surfaces or a susceptible person’s hands (assuming some remains on the contaminated person’s hands; 
n=4 for all estimates)
Scenario
Estimated percentage of virus 
transmitted, median (50% range)










Same room, no direct contact 10 (4–53) 0.5 (0.1–1) 3 115–119
Sharing table, limited shared contact 14 (6–21) 0.5 (0.1–1) 3.5 111 115 116 118 119
Regular contact with shared items 20 (8–38) 2 (1–3) 3.75
Regular direct contact 15 (6–38) 21 (8–33) 3.5 45
Table 10 Participants’ estimates for the effect of different mitigation measures on loss of infectious virus during transfer from 
hands to surrounding surfaces or a susceptible person’s hands
Mitigation
(infected person)
Estimated percentage loss of virus in transit, median 
(50% range)










to Susceptible person’s 
hands
Hand hygiene 60 (33–81) 59 (35–79) 4 120 121
Gloves 43 (22–64) 30 (20–49) 3 122 123
80 (53–92) 83 (74–92)
Staying in space half as long 43 (22–57) 50 (39–57)
Participants noted that there were many individual 
factors that would create variation in the percentage 
splits, such as the proportion of the time spent breathing 
through the nose versus the mouth. Environmental 
factors such as humidity and temperature could also affect 
the moisture content, but the effects of these factors on 
viral content is unknown. During coughing, some partic-
ipants thought that particles from coughing were more 
likely to come from the deep lung and hence be smaller, 
while others thought they might be larger. It was noted 
that there was little empirical research in patients with 
SARS- CoV- 2 specifically.
No participants thought that any of the variants of 
concern were likely to behave differently on this pathway.
Impact of source control mitigation: Participants were 
asked to estimate the difference that four different 
potential face covering mitigations would have on the 
amount of infectious virus that would reach the environ-
ment via each of the three size fractions (A: aerosols, B: 
small droplets, and C: large droplets). They were asked 
to assume a reasonable fit (eg, covering the nose) and 
no resuspension of material deposited on the mask or 
visor.
Table 3 shows there was a good degree of consensus, 
with participants judging higher quality face masks to 
provide the greatest protection against all particle sizes. 
Home- made face coverings and surgical masks show the 
greatest variation, which may reflect assumptions relating 
to both fit and material effectiveness.
Pathway 3: factors that affect the amount of virus that can be 
inhaled or inspired from environment by a susceptible person
Seven participants contributed data on this pathway, 
considering loss to the environment, once exhaled, of 
infectious virus emitted via aerosols (0–10 micrometre 
diameter) or small droplets (10–100 μm) under different 
environmental conditions, or different mitigations that 
might be applied.
Dispersion of virus with location and ventilation: First, 
participants were asked to consider the effects of room 
size and ventilation on the percentage loss during trans-
mission between a single infected person and a single 
susceptible person standing 2 m apart with no face cover-
ings (note, this is loss once exhaled, while pathway 2 
considered exhalation into the environment).
As seen in table 4, participants differed in their opinions 
of the percentage loss to the environment. Participants 
in round 2 had been offered low, medium or high loss 
of aerosols as a way of separating the ’camps’. Although 
participants coalesced more than in round 1, to just one 
or two ’camps’, their estimates still showed considerable 
disagreement over the likely percentage loss (see online 
supplemental information 5).
Participants in round 1 had already raised the possible 
effects of humidity and temperature, natural leakage 
rates of a building affecting air change rates, the physical 
location of the two people relative to each other and any 
furniture, and the potential influence of other people on 
the indoor setting. For the outdoor scenario, wind speed, 
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Estimated percentage loss of 
virus, median (50% range)
Mean quality of evidence 
rating (1–5) (round 2)
References given
(across both rounds)
Shared wooden table 4 81 (48–94) 2.75 115–119 124
Metal or ceramic (condiments, 
handrail, touch screen etc)
2 74 (63–85) 3 114 115 118 125
2 42 (26–45)
Paper or card (eg, leaflets, 
packets in shop)
4 87 (72–100) 2.5 114 115 118
Table 12 Participants’ estimates on the percentage loss of infectious virus during transfer from surfaces to hands under 




Estimated percentage loss of 
virus, median (50% range)
Mean quality of evidence 
rating (1–5) (round 2)
References given
(across both rounds)
Surface cleaning 4 82 (68–96) 3.25 121 126
Wearing gloves 4 23 (8–38) 3 122 123
Hand hygiene 2 50 (35–65) 3.5
turbulence and obstructions as well as temperature and 
humidity were raised as likely significant factors. Partic-
ipants disagreed in their opinions on whether there 
would be any reduction at all of infectious virus in the 
air, regardless of whether the moisture component of 
the exhaled air evaporated (which itself was contended). 
Some thought that the viral elements, even in the small 
droplets, might settle onto surfaces over time. There was 
near universal agreement that the necessary experiments 
had not yet been done, exploring air flow patterns using 
suitable tracers within a number of realistic situations 
compared against data with actual viral particles.
Dispersion with distance: Participants were then asked 
to consider the effects of distance, by considering the 
percentage loss if the infected and susceptible person 
were either closer than 2 m or further apart than 2 m. 
Participants rated the quality of the evidence behind their 
estimates on the effects of distance as 3.0 for aerosols and 
3.25 for small particles. A summary of their estimates 
is shown in table 5, and again participants’ responses 
showed considerable variability (see online supplemental 
information 5).
One participant pointed out that if participants are 
closer than 2 m apart then the size of an unventilated 
room is essentially irrelevant. In ventilated rooms, the 
design of the ventilation and resulting airflow patterns 
relative to the location of individuals may become 
important. Outdoors, the amount of ambient air flow in 
most scenarios means that beyond 2 m distance partici-
pants suggest transmission is very unlikely.
Measures to protect the susceptible person: Finally, partici-
pants were asked to estimate any additional percentage 
loss that might be caused by the susceptible person being 
behind a face covering or shield (assuming an appro-
priate fit and no accompanying behaviour change).
There was general agreement that exposure to larger 
particles would likely be reduced more than smaller ones. 
When it came to a plastic face visor, some thought that 
may even increase exposure to small droplets. See table 6.
A few participants mentioned other potential mitiga-
tion measures, such as air cleaning (although there was 
no clear evidence of efficacy that they could cite), or 
personal ventilation systems.35–41
Pathway 4: factors affecting surface transmission of the virus
In this, the largest individual section of the survey, partic-
ipants were asked their opinions on a range of questions 
involving the transfer of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 virus from 
large droplets (>100 μm) to surfaces and a susceptible 
person’s hands. Six participants contributed data to this 
section.
Fate of large droplets: For four scenarios, participants were 
asked for their estimates of the proportions of virus they 
thought likely to be transmitted from large droplets to 
the hands of an infected person onto all surrounding 
surfaces, or directly onto the hands of a susceptible 
person, compared with those likely to remain in the air 
(ie, going on to pathway 5).
Generally there was agreement that the amount of virus 
going directly onto the hands of a susceptible person was 
likely to be very small, and that droplets of this size would 
mostly tend to fall quite rapidly onto surfaces (table 7). 
Round 1 data did not obviously show a bimodal distri-
bution in the responses. However, round 2 responses do 
indicate variations of opinion (see online supplemental 
information 6). For example, estimates of whether the 
amount of virus transmitted to surrounding surfaces 
would be above the indicated range (upper boundary 
58.1%), in a situation where participants were not in direct 
contact, ranged from 1% to 64%. Similar differences are 
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Figure 6 Participants’ estimates of the percentage of infectious virus carried in large (>100 μm) airborne particles that would 
NOT reach a susceptible person’s mucous membranes if the infected and susceptible person were (A) within 2 m of each other 
and (B) further than 2 m apart from each other in an unventilated room. In each case, the top graph shows individual estimates, 
the middle graph the average of those estimates, and the bottom graph a cumulative probability distribution, with (in green) the 
median and interquartile range. Values in parentheses to the right show percentage below, within, and above the range. Values 
in parentheses on the left of the bottom graph show 25th, 50th and 75th percentile estimates from the combined responses.
Table 13 Participants' estimates of the percentage loss of infectious virus from large droplets (>100 μm) in the air after 
exhalation from an infected person before it reaches the mucous membranes of a susceptible person nearby
Percentage loss, median 
(50% range)
Mean quality of evidence 
rating (1–5) (round 2)
References given (across both 
rounds)
Closer than 2 m 56 (46–76) 3.25 62 96
Further apart than 2 m 85 (75–94) 3.5
seen in many of the other estimates. We note that these 
values might also change if symptoms such as a runny 
nose are features of infection.
Participants noted that uncertainties and variability in 
estimates would be caused by factors such as the ambient 
temperature, humidity and the distance between the 
individuals, as well as their orientation to each other and 
their behaviour. Participants mentioned, for example, 
the amount of talking, respiratory hygiene and amount 
of coughing. Although these were considered in other 
parts of the questionnaire and here the intention was 
to elicit estimates regarding the fate of a given amount 
(considered 100%) of droplets larger than 100 μm, the 
proportions that might be projected different distances 
and in different directions by these sorts of behaviours 
were seen by participants as important sources of varia-
tion in the proportion that would follow each of the spec-
ified onward paths.
Participants did note that, although it stated that 
percentages should sum 100%, the question wording was 
not specific about whether ‘surrounding surfaces’ should 
include only those that might be touched (eg, excluding 
the floor), or for all surfaces, which might explain some 
of the diversity of views. In the scenarios involving tables 
or desks, most participants thought that more was likely 
to be deposited on these as they were closer to and 
more in line with people’s faces (as well as being ‘shared 
surfaces’). The nature of shared objects was also a cause 
of uncertainty in some scenarios, although again some 
participants’ answers suggested that they were already 
attempting to take into consideration aspects of the trans-
mission that were to be considered further ‘downstream’, 
such as the amount of contact with those surfaces.
Some participants thought there would be no effect of 
duration of exposure, one that there would be an upward 
curve to steady state and one that it would keep increasing 
with time. One cited references, without comment.42–44 
All agreed that it was unlikely that any variants of the virus 
would cause different estimates at this point in the trans-
mission pathway.
Mitigating large droplet transfer: Participants were asked 
whether a range of potential mitigation measures would 
affect the transmission of the virus to the hands of the 
infected or susceptible person or surrounding surfaces; 
see table 8 and online supplemental information 6 for 
graphs of the individual and pooled responses.
Some participants thought that ventilation could 
change air flow paths to the extent that transmission 
might be reduced along all pathways to a small degree, 
but several others thought that ventilation indoors would 
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Table 14 Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus from large droplets (>100 μm) caused by 
different mitigation measures employed by a susceptible person (n=4 in all cases)
Mitigation
(susceptible person)
Percentage loss of virus carried in 
large particles, median (50% range)
Mean quality of evidence 
rating (1–5) (round 2)
References given
(across both rounds)
Home- made cotton face covering 57 (47–67) 3
‘Surgical’ face mask 57 (47–67) 3
FFP3 or similar face mask 71 (63–79) 2.5
Plastic face visor 73 (50–81) 3 127–129
Being behind a Perspex screen 65 (50–81) 3.3
make no real difference at all to large droplets. It was 
also speculated that ventilation might change relative 
humidity, which might change transmission along these 
pathways. Outdoors, ultraviolet levels, humidity and local-
ised air flow patterns were all suggested to have an effect, 
with increased wind speed potentially carrying droplets 
further.
There was agreement that the infected person wearing 
a face mask was likely to substantially reduce large 
droplets being spread both through direct capture and 
changing the wearer’s behaviour to reduce face touching. 
Participants suggested that a Perspex screen between the 
infected and susceptible person might reduce the chance 
of large droplet transmission directly to the hands of the 
susceptible person, and reduce the extent of spread to 
shared surrounding surfaces.
Participants were split on respiratory hygiene, with 
some thinking it could almost block some of the poten-
tial transmission paths, and others being a lot more pessi-
mistic about its effectiveness, thinking that the percussion 
behind a sneeze or cough is too great for a tissue or sleeve 
to catch the particles. One participant pointed out that 
contamination to the susceptible person’s hands may 
even increase if they were holding the tissue. When asked 
about gloves, participants said that absorbent materials 
might behave differently from skin or non- porous mate-
rials and also that gloves may affect behaviour. Some 
participants may have already been thinking ahead to 
the next stage of the transmission chain—the likelihood 
of virus survival or passing on to a susceptible person 
from hands or gloves. This may explain some diversity in 
answers, but it is important to note that here the diver-
sity of opinions ranges from ‘0%’ to ‘70%–100%’ for the 
potential reduction in virus transmission to the infected 
person’s hands and the susceptible person’s hands.
When asked about halving the length of the time of the 
encounter, participants generally thought this would make 
little difference in terms of the infected person’s hands 
because these would be infected outside of the timeframe 
of the encounter. For contamination of surrounding 
surfaces or the susceptible person’s hands, one partici-
pant described a linear proportional increase with time, 
then becoming balanced by exponential natural inacti-
vation of the viral particles (faster on skin than on most 
other surfaces), based on references indicated.
None believed that any of the variants of concern of 
the virus known about at the time were likely to behave 
differently in this pathway.
Transfer from hands to surfaces and people: Participants 
were then asked their estimates for the proportion of 
infectious virus present on the hands of an infected 
person that would likely be passed on in a viable form 
to surrounding surfaces compared with those that might 
be transferred directly to the hands of another person 
under a number of different scenarios —with no mitiga-
tions and with encounters long enough for virus transfer 
to be at steady state (but no prior contamination until the 
infected person enters the scenario). See online supple-
mental information 6 for participants’ individual esti-
mates and table 9 for a summary.
Participants mostly based their answers on work done 
on other pathogens, suggesting hand- to- surface transfer 
efficiencies would depend on the materials involved, the 
area of contact, and potentially duration of contact. Inac-
tivation rates of the virus would need to be borne in mind, 
but most participants assumed that in these scenarios 
it would be irrelevant as contact would be a short time 
after contamination of the hand. On the ‘shared desk’ 
scenario, one participant cited work showing high rates of 
contact with desks, but overall transfer was thought to be 
below 50% on this path. As direct contact increased, the 
probabilities increased, and one participant mentioned 
that there was some evidence that transfer efficiencies are 
log- normally distributed.45
No one knew of evidence that any variants of concern 
would behave differently in this pathway.
In mitigating transfer of virus through hand hygiene 
(table 10), participants were asked to assume it was 
carried out well, but raised the importance of timing 
(including how soon after washing their hands contact 
with surfaces happened, during which time there was the 
opportunity for recontamination) and the variable effec-
tiveness of hand hygiene. Participants discussed uncer-
tainties associated with contamination during donning 
and doffing of gloves, and the behavioural changes that 
gloves might encourage such as potentially less face 
touching, but potentially a feeling of protection leading 
to more sneezing into hands and more surface touching.
When asked about the effects of halving the time spent 
in a scenario, participants generally indicated that the 
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Figure 7 Participants’ individual estimates (top graphs) and pooled estimates (middle and bottom graphs) of the percentage 
reduction in infections virus transferred from a person’s contaminated hands to their mucous membranes A) under normal 
conditions, (B) if the person was wearing a face shield, (C) if the person was wearing gloves, (D) & (E) if the person was wearing 
a face covering (participants divided into two distinct camps on this question), (F) intervals elicited for the first time in round 2 
from individuals (top graph, blue) and pooled (bottom graph, green) if the person were practising good hand hygiene. For graphs 
(A) to (E) the top graph shows individual estimates, the middle graph the average of those estimates, and the bottom graph a 
cumulative probability distribution, with (in green) the median and inter- quartile range. Values in parentheses to the right show 
percentage below, within and above the range. Values in parentheses in the bottom graph show 25th, 50th and 75th percentile 
estimates from the combined responses. The vertical dashed line shows the 100% reference case. For graph (F) the figures on 
right hand axis show individual responses in the upper graph and the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile values in the lower graph.
question was not answerable because it was absolute 
time, not relative time, that was important; and far more 
important than time was frequency of surface touching.
Transfer from surface to hands: The final section of this 
pathway focused on transfer from a contaminated surface 
to the hands of a susceptible person. Participants were 
asked about likely loss during transference in a number 
of different scenarios, initially with no mitigations.
Participants discussed uncertainties caused by the 
unknown duration and frequency of touch, the humidity 
and roughness of the surfaces, and whether the virus was 
in wet or dried respiratory secretions. Some thought that 
metal and ceramic surfaces would potentially support 
longer survival of infectious virus than paper and card; 
others were not so sure. Some thought that transfer effi-
ciency would likely be higher on hard, smooth surfaces 
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Table 15 Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction in infectious virus transferred from a person’s contaminated 





Percentage loss of virus from hand to 
mucous membranes, median (50% range)






None 5 67 (54–79) 2.8 115 130–132
Face mask (any type) 3 79 (70–88) 2.8 133
2 36 (30–43)
Gloves 5 24 (7–40) 1.8 122
Plastic face visor 5 32 (18–43) 2.4
Hand hygiene 5 73 (37–84) 3 134–136
and lower with paper. Others raised the differences in 
gripping behaviour with different surfaces and objects—
with small items such as plates or condiments more likely 
to encourage overlapping areas of grip between hands, 
increasing potential transfer. See table 11 for a summary 
of their estimates, and online supplemental information 
6 for the individual estimates.
They agreed that there was no evidence to suggest that 
any of the variants of concern would behave differently in 
this pathway.
Participants mentioned that surface cleaning 
(described as ‘cleaned thoroughly with an alcohol- based 
cleaning product’) had large uncertainties associated 
with the timing between cleaning and surface touching, 
although the cleaning itself, if done appropriately, could 
be highly effective. With gloves, some thought there was 
even enhanced possibility for transfer due to a larger 
surface area, and the differences between different glove 
materials was discussed. When it came to hand hygiene, 
participants mentioned that washing changes the surface 
properties of hands temporarily to become more hydro-
philic, and some speculated that if hands are not dry they 
may increase surface transfer efficacy. See online supple-
mental information 6 for their individual estimates, and 
table 12 for summaries.
When asked about transfer efficacy from contaminated 
hands which were secondarily contaminated, rather than 
directly contaminated from an infected person’s respi-
ratory secretions, participants noted that the amount of 
drying that would have taken place along the chain of 
contamination would likely reduce transfer efficacy.
Another potential mitigation that participants raised 
but about which opinions were not elicited was the poten-
tial role of anti- microbial surfaces such as copper.
Pathway 5: factors affecting the transmission of large 
particles directly to a susceptible person’s mucous 
membranes
In this section, participants were asked their opinions on 
how much infectious virus was likely to be lost to the envi-
ronment from large droplets in the air (>100 μm) before 
reaching a susceptible person’s mucous membranes 
under different conditions. Four participants contributed 
data to this pathway. See online supplemental informa-
tion 7 for details of their estimates.
Many participants in round 1 had found these estimates 
particularly difficult to make because of the degree of 
chance and variability according to specific conditions 
involved, such as the directions the people involved were 
facing, their behaviour, their speech and respiration 
patterns. The wording in round 2 appeared to help partic-
ipants, although there was still a fair degree of difference 
of opinion (see figure 6). It was noted that the UK’s ‘2 m 
rule’ was based on the distance that these larger particles 
might travel but that coughing (or an exhaled ‘puff’) was 
not considered in this rule.
All participants agreed that it was unlikely that any of 
the variants of concern of SARS- CoV- 2 would behave 
differently in this pathway. They also agreed that their 
estimates of the likelihood of transmission along this 
pathway would not be affected by ventilation of the room 
or whether the people were outdoors rather than indoors. 
See table 13 for a summary of their estimates.
When asked how the length of time of exposure might 
affect estimates, participants mentioned that this was not 
known but that it probably increased linearly—possibly 
up to a threshold at which point infection was almost 
certain. However, this point was not yet known.
Face coverings worn by the susceptible person were 
thought to reduce the large droplet transmission poten-
tial because they cover the mouth and nose (although not 
the eyes). One mentioned that contamination from the 
outside of the mask to the hands or the inside of the mask 
could occur, but that transfer from a porous fabric to a 
hand was likely to be low. Participants generally thought 
that FFP3 masks were likely to offer little additional 
reduction in these larger droplets over a surgical face 
mask. A large factor in variability of mitigation offered 
by a surgical face mask would be tightness of fit. It was 
mentioned that a face visor formed a physical barrier 
which, in other diseases and in observational data from 
COVID- 19 outbreaks, seemed to reduce infection risk 
from larger droplets.
When considering Perspex screens, participants 
mentioned that the positioning was important, and in 
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Table 16 Individual participants’ opinions on the dominance of aerosols and the loss through aerosols and droplets (where 
there were ‘camps’ of opinion) shown by specialism. Here aerosols are less than 10 μm in diameter, while droplets include 
small (10–100 μm) and large (>100 μm). Individual responses shown for the estimates from tables 2, 4 and 6. Colours are used 
to differentiate the different camps visually
‘Camps’ Engineers Chemists Epidemiologists Medic Microbiologist
Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious SARS- CoV- 2 produced by an infected person that would be found in each of three 
different size fractions of respiratory particles (as in table 2)
Silent
Aerosol dominant Y Y     Y   Y Y Y   
Evenly split                   Y
Droplet dominant                     
Speaking
Aerosol dominant                 Y   
Evenly split Y Y     Y   Y     Y
Droplet dominant                     
Talking loudly
Aerosol dominant                 Y   
Evenly split Y Y     Y           
Droplet dominant             Y       
Coughing
Aerosol dominant                     
Evenly split   Y         Y   Y   
Droplet dominant Y       Y           
Singing
Aerosol dominant                 Y   
Evenly split Y Y     Y           
Droplet dominant             Y       
Exercising
Aerosol dominant                 Y   
Evenly split Y Y     Y           
Droplet dominant             Y       
Eating
Aerosol dominant Y           Y   Y   
Evenly split   Y                 
Droplet dominant         Y           
Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious virus that would be lost to the environment when travelling via aerosols or small droplets 
in different environments (susceptible person and infected person 2 m apart) (as in table 4)
Small unventilated room
(loss via aerosols)
More than half         Y           
Around half Y   Y               
Less than half   Y   Y   Y         
Large unventilated room
(loss via aerosols)
More than half     Y               
Around half       Y Y           
Less than half Y Y       Y         
Large unventilated room
(loss via small droplets)
More than half         Y           
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‘Camps’ Engineers Chemists Epidemiologists Medic Microbiologist
Less than half   Y       Y         
Participants' estimates of the effects of different mitigations taken by a susceptible person on the potential prevention of infectious SARS- CoV2 
inhaled via two different fractions of infected exhaled air (as in table 6)
Effect of home- made face covering on loss via aerosols
More than half           Y         
Around half                     
Less than half   Y   Y Y           
Effect of surgical face mask on loss via aerosols
More than half   Y   Y   Y         
Around half                     
Less than half         Y           
Table 16 Continued
the real world many were located too far away. They also 
mentioned that a poorly positioned screen could poten-
tially increase exposure to infected aerosols.46 47 See 
table 14 for a summary of their estimates.
In terms of other possible mitigations, one participant 
mentioned a study from China suggesting that wearing 
glasses may decrease transmission by protecting the 
eyes, but that this had not been followed up with more 
evidence.48
Pathway 6: how much virus is likely to be transmitted from a 
susceptible person’s hands to their mucous membranes under 
different conditions
Five participants contributed data on pathway 6. They 
were first asked the likely percentage loss of virus during 
transfer from a susceptible person’s hands to their mucous 
membranes with no mitigations in place, and then the loss 
due to different potential mitigations that the susceptible 
person might employ. Participants’ individual estimates 
and summary graphs are given in figure 7 and table 15.
Participants mentioned that uncertainties around the 
behaviour of the individual such as the amount of face 
touching was important and there may be some gender 
differences.49 The time elapsed since hands were contam-
inated (‘fresh’ or dry), the environmental conditions of 
the hands (moisture content, pH, temperature etc) and 
the part of the hand used/contaminated50 were all cited 
as relevant factors that may influence hand- to- mucous 
membrane transfer. Participants pointed out that face 
coverings do not protect the eyes, but there is evidence 
that they can reduce the frequency of face touching in 
general. With gloves, there was not so much evidence on 
how much they might change face touching, but there 
was a view that viral transfer was still possible from contact 
between gloves and membranes. When asked about face 
visors, they mentioned that although visors may remind 
people not to touch their face, they were much more able 
to reach under it to do so than with a face mask, and that 
an itch could be scratched ‘though’ a fabric mask without 
skin- to- skin contact.
Hand sanitisation, participants said, could be very 
effective but depends how frequently and how well it is 
performed, leaving very high variability and uncertainty 
in any estimate.
It was pointed out that the different degrees of 
absorption of infectious virus through different mucous 
membrane routes (eg, eyes vs nose vs mouth) was 
unknown, and that almost all studies on this pathway 
(such as exist) are laboratory based and so miss out on 
crucial ‘real world’ behavioural aspects, and many are not 
on SARS- CoV- 2 specifically and so their generalisability to 
this particular virus is unknown.
They were not aware of any evidence that would suggest 
that any of the variants of concern behaved differently on 
this pathway. However they raised other methods of trans-
ference such as touching cigarettes, inhalers and other 
oral devices; food and drink.
dIsCussIOn
The purpose of this pragmatic expert elicitation was to 
collate current knowledge relating to the mechanisms of 
SARS- CoV- 2 transmission for which there is a paucity of 
empirical evidence. The intention was that this process 
would generate expert- informed estimated ranges for 
a number of key parameters that could then be used 
to quantify (approximately) the relative importance of 
different routes of transmission of SARS- CoV- 2 in a range 
of contexts.
In some cases, this process has been relatively successful 
in achieving our aim. Pathways 1 and 6 (and to a lesser 
extent, 5), for example, showed a reasonable degree of 
expert agreement on the ranges elicited. The amount 
of disagreement relating to large droplet and surface 
contact transmission (eg, pathway 4) may have been 
masked by a lack of diversity in opinions in round 1, 
which meant that participants were not offered different 
‘camps’ during round 2. Their responses in round 2 
(see online supplemental information 6) often revealed 
considerable disagreement, which may have been better 
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reflected as alternative camps of opinion. However path-
ways 2 and 3, describing the production of aerosols and 
small particles by an infected person and the extent to 
which these two fractions of respiratory output remain 
in the environment, revealed considerable disagreement 
between experts.
We examined whether the differences of opinion 
seen on the degree to which aerosols and droplets were 
involved in transmission were a matter of consistently 
different camps of opinion, perhaps related to partic-
ipants’ domain of experience. Table 16 shows that in 
some cases there appears to be a majority opinion, while 
in others (particularly in pathway 3), there was consid-
erable disagreement, even between participants with the 
same fields of expertise. It is likely that more diversity of 
opinion exists in the broader pool of worldwide experts 
than is apparent in round 2 of this elicitation process 
since some camps of opinion represented in round 1 
were not represented in round 2 because the two rounds 
had different (but overlapping) participant pools.
This study highlights the substantial lack of empirical 
evidence relating to many aspects of SARS- CoV- 2 trans-
mission. Despite this, the study confirms three main 
findings: (1) expert views suggest SARS- CoV- 2 is likely 
to be transmitted via a number of different routes, the 
relative contributions of which will vary by context, but 
all of which may be of relevance; (2) there is a lack of 
scientific consensus on the importance of each of the 
pathways even among those who have studied elements 
of these pathways for SARS- CoV- 2 and other diseases in 
detail; and (3) effectively reducing transmission of the 
virus likely requires bundles of interventions that target 
multiple different routes simultaneously because in many 
scenarios there are multiple potential routes for infection.
The lack of consensus on the likelihoods of transmis-
sion via critical pathways, indicated not just by experts’ 
different mathematical estimates but by the rationales 
they gave which showed that these differences were truly 
based on fundamental differences of opinion, shows that 
further research is required to elucidate these in more 
detail, and with more certainty. More importantly there is 
a need for stronger evidence for the absolute and relative 
effects of mitigation measures, used alone and in combi-
nation. Even in a world where the overall majority of the 
population has been vaccinated against this particular 
infection, large numbers of people will remain vulnerable 
to all strains (and future respiratory- borne diseases), and 
some simple measures are likely to be required over the 
medium to long term.
What we might perhaps learn, then, is first the impor-
tance of specific empirical studies, on SARS- CoV- 2 where 
possible, including data from a variety of real- world envi-
ronments to better inform our understanding of trans-
mission. Second, however, perhaps a greater admission 
and communication of the large uncertainties that we 
still have about the transmission process. Public health 
communications which confidently state ‘facts’ without 
also communicating uncertainty in the absence of a firm 
knowledge base not only misinform the public but could 
be damaging to public trust as new information emerges.
The study has many limitations. Perhaps the greatest is 
the possibility of bias within the participant pool. It was 
hard to identify a suitable range of experts who were also 
prepared to give up the considerable time required to 
participate in this study, and many invited experts found 
the process too long, difficult or time consuming to 
complete the survey. This self- selecting population inevi-
tably leaves open room for biases, as does the initial prag-
matic based selection.
Another limitation is that by using a purely online survey 
form, rather than in- person interviews, it was not possible 
to help guide participants through the difficult process 
of translating their subjective knowledge into numerical, 
probabilistic ranges. It is clear from the answers in both 
rounds that many participants struggled with the task (for 
example, see the round 1 answers in figure 3, where some 
participants gave point estimates with no uncertainty at all 
when asked for their subjective 95% probability interval, 
while others gave a range of ‘0%–100%’). The addition of 
extra clarification wording in round 2 to help participants 
understand what was being asked of them (for example, 
to take into account both epistemic uncertainty and vari-
ability of the situation into their ranges) may have helped, 
but a one- to- one conversation would almost certainly have 
helped more. Despite working in numerical disciplines, 
many experts still struggle with expressing their knowl-
edge in the form of probabilities and calibration of their 
uncertainty.28 Internal consistency in answers was also 
variable, although when the estimates were collated and 
transformed to be used in the interactive visualisation, in 
only one case did the majority opinion prove inconsistent 
(the percentage loss of virus in a large unventilated room 
being lower than that in a small unventilated room), and 
in this single instance the minority estimate had to be 
taken for the overall visualisation to prove consistent and 
logical.
It is also important to note that this process concen-
trated on transmission between two individuals meeting 
in a particular scenario, and hence does not consider 
population- level mitigation strategies such as self- isolation. 
It also does not include vaccination as a mitigation.
Because of these limitations, we emphasise that none 
of the estimated ranges obtained in this expert elicitation 
should be taken in isolation as a figure on which to base 
decisions. However, taken as a whole, with all uncertain-
ties and variability in scenarios accounted for, we believe 
the results serve a useful purpose.
Despite the lack of consensus in the underlying 
expert judgement and the difficulties that experts had 
in completing it, this study has provided a basis for 
assessing the current views on many different elements 
of the transmission process. By breaking down the trans-
mission process into multiple steps, the study enabled 
understanding of precisely which elements of trans-
mission currently carry the most epistemic uncertainty 
and hence would benefit most from further study. 
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Importantly it provides a framework of estimates that can 
be taken together to communicate the relative impor-
tance of different routes of transmission as well as their 
uncertainties (https:// sandpit. bmj. com/ graphics/ 2021/ 
trans/). This can be taken as reflecting the current state 
of knowledge of transmission of SARS- CoV- 2, and despite 
its limitations due to lack of strong empirical evidence, 
appears likely to be of use for decision- makers wanting to 
understand the relative importance of different possible 
mitigation actions and their associated variability and 
uncertainties. It would be valuable to revisit the process in 
the future to determine how the underpinning evidence 
and the related expert opinion has developed. It might 
also serve as a template for more rapidly examining 
transmission of other infectious pathogens. Indeed, the 
overall method of producing an interactive visualisation 
to represent a quantified—but not precise—representa-
tion of ‘the best current state of knowledge’ of a system 
for practical use could be of use in many other different 
circumstances, such as financial, environmental or trans-
port systems.
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Supplementary information 1: Quantitative basis for visualisation of transmission 
The structure of the diagram shown in Figure 1 in the main paper can be considered conceptually as 
a weighted directed graph (a mathematical description of a network as opposed to a chart for 
visualising data) whose nodes are the circles and whose edges are the arrows between the circles. 
The intention of the related visualisation is to show the importance of the different routes in 
contributing to transmission and the overall rate of virus transmission. The weight of each edge in 
the graph reflects the rate of viable virus transferred between the two nodes that it connects. The 
graph is analogous to a flow network with the input from the infected person and the output 
reaching the susceptible person. The flow through the branching and recombining network is 
determined by splits defined wherever more than one edge leaves a node and through reductions 
because of environmental factors and mitigation measures applied. 
The following properties are defined for the graph: 
1. Nodes have no capacity. In other words, virus does not build up in any node. This is 
equivalent to assuming steady state conditions for the network. While this is a necessary 
simplification for data elicitation and communication, it is an important consideration when 
interpreting the visualisation. 
2. The sum of inflows to each node equals the sum of outflows from each node 
3. Splits define the fraction of viable virus flowing between each outflow from a node. These 
splits sum to 1.0 (100%). 
4. For a given environment, the amount of viable virus flowing along an edge may be reduced 
by multiplying by a factor between 0 and 1.0. Only a single environment applies for a given 
scenario. 
5. For each mitigation factor applied, the amount of viable virus flowing along an edge may be 
reduced by multiplying by a factor between 0 and 1.0. A mitigation measure may apply to 
one or more edge. Multiple mitigation measures can be applied at the same time and their 
reduction effect multiplied together. 
6. The input to the graph depends on the activity of the infected person and the overall flow 
rate through the network will scale with this factor. 
It is important to note that the graph and the edge weights describe a flow of virus per unit time. 
The overall amount of virus transmitted in a given scenario will depend on the duration of the 
exposure. 
To calculate the edge weights of the graph the following algorithm can be used: 
1. Start from the input from the infectious person  
2. Calculate the outflow from the node (equal to the defined input for the infectious person or 
the sum of the inflows for all other nodes) 
3. Multiply each edge by the defined split fraction to determine the outflow along the edge 
4. Multiply the edge weight by the chosen environment reduction factor 
5. Multiply the edge weight by the applied mitigation reduction factors for all of the 
mitigations in force 
6. The resulting edge weight then forms the inflow into the downstream node 
7. Repeat for each node in order. The directed graph can be considered as a partially ordered 
set and used to determine the appropriate order. Outflows from nodes cannot be calculated 
until the weights for all inflows have been determined. 
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The resulting edge weights for a given environment condition and selection of mitigating measures 
can then be used to scale a visualisation of viral transmission for example using colour, size or a 
combination of both. The use of elicited data provides the values for the scaling factors required. 
The approach described above is not a quantitative model for viral transmission. The approach is 
deliberately simplified to support the communication of relative transfer of virus between two 
individuals in a form that can be used to elicit data from experts and to compare environments and 
mitigation measures. In addition, the approach only considers the transfer of virus between 
individuals and does not necessarily imply that virus exposure by different routes will result in the 
same degree of risk. 
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Pathway Estimates sought (red = round 2 only) 
Pathway 1: factors that affect the amount of virus 
exhaled by an infected person
   
Activity only 
(elicited as relative percentage compared to 
baseline) 
Compared to an infected person with a normal respiratory rate, not speaking 
(considered to be 100%), the percentage range of infectious virus produced by 
someone with normal respiratory rate who was: 
- speaking at average volume (i.e. not projecting their voice) 





- infected with a new variant of concern 
 
 
Pathway 2: factors that affect the amount of virus 
put out into the environment in the form of aerosols, 
small droplets & large droplets 
The percentage range of infectious virus split between path A (aerosols <10 
micrometres) path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) and path C (large droplets, 
over 100 micrometres) for someone who was: 
- silent (just breathing normally) 
- speaking at average volume (i.e. not projecting their voice) 
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(both elicited as percentage splits) 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that any of 
the new variants of concern of SARS-CoV-2 may behave differently in any way in this 
pathway? 
 
Now tell us about the percentage range of infectious virus split between each 
pathway (A: aerosols, B: small droplets and C: large droplets) if… 
 
- the infected person is wearing a home-made cotton face covering 
- the infected person is wearing a simple ‘surgical’ face mask 
- the infected person is wearing a FFP3 face mask or similar 
- the infected person is wearing a plastic face visor 
 
Now tell us about the percentage loss of infectious virus along each pathway (A: 
aerosols, B: small droplets and C: large droplets) if… 
 
- the infected person is wearing a home-made cotton face covering 
- the infected person is wearing a simple ‘surgical’ face mask 
- the infected person is wearing a FFP3 face mask or similar 
- the infected person is wearing a plastic face visor 
 
Pathway 3: factors that affect the amount of virus 
that can be inhaled or inspired from the environment 
Considering just the distribution of viable, infectious virus in different sized liquid 
droplets in the air after an infected person has been in the space, please let us know 
how much you think will be lost to the environment along each of Path A and Path B, 
and how that will be affected by each of a range of scenarios. 
 
Of that starting volume of infectious virus (now considered 100%), the ranges of 
the percentage reduction of infectious virus from aerosols (<10 micrometres) (path 
A) and small droplets (10-100 micrometres) (path B) if both the infected person and 
susceptible person were 2m from each other in:  
- a small, unventilated room together 
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by an uninfected person  
 
Environment & mitigation 
 
Baseline split elicited 
 
Then all environment and mitigation effects elicited 
as percentage reductions (i.e. loss to environment) 
 
- a small, ventilated room  
- a large, unventilated room  
- a large, ventilated room  
- outdoors 
 
Considering only Path A (aerosols, <10 micrometres), what ranges of percentage 
reduction of the viable infectious virus that was produced by the infected person do 
you estimate if they were closer than 2m in the following conditions: 
- a small, unventilated room 
- a small, ventilated room  
- a large, unventilated room  
- a large, ventilated room  
- outdoors 
 
Considering only Path A (aerosols, <10 micrometres), what ranges of percentage 
reduction of the viable infectious virus that was produced by the infected person do 
you estimate if they were further apart than 2m in the following conditions: 
- a small, unventilated room 
- a small, ventilated room  
- a large, unventilated room  
- a large, ventilated room  
- outdoors 
 
Considering only Path B (small droplets, 10-100 micrometres), what ranges of 
percentage reduction of the viable infectious virus that was produced by the infected 
person do you estimate if they were closer than 2m in the following conditions: 
- a small, unventilated room 
- a small, ventilated room  
- a large, unventilated room  
- a large, ventilated room  
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- outdoors 
 
Considering only Path B (small droplets, 10-100 micrometres), what ranges of 
percentage reduction of the viable infectious virus that was produced by the infected 
person do you estimate if they were further apart than 2m in the following 
conditions: 
- a small, unventilated room 
- a small, ventilated room  
- a large, unventilated room  
- a large, ventilated room  
- outdoors 
 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that any of 
the new variants of concern of SARS-CoV-2 may behave differently in any way in this 
pathway? Please give as much detail as you can for your opinion. 
 
Now consider the following potential mitigations. By what percentage do you think 
the amount of infectious virus received by the susceptible person would likely be 
reduced along path A (aerosols, <10 micrometres) or path B (small droplets, 10-100 
micrometres) if: 
- they are wearing a home-made cotton face covering  
- they are wearing a ‘surgical’ mask 
- they are wearing a FFP3 mask or similar 
- they are wearing a plastic face visor 
- they are sitting behind a perspex screen? 
 
 
Pathway 4: factors that affect the transmission of the 
virus from large droplets (>100 micrometres) to 
First we would like you to tell us your estimates for the proportions of the amount of 
infectious virus present in large droplets (>100 micrometres) produced during 
respiration by an infected person that would likely be passed on to the hands of the 
infected person (path A), directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C) or 
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Splits for each activity elicited (and question asked 






onto all surrounding surfaces (path B), compared with those remaining in the air 
(path D), in a range of different scenarios. These values should sum 100%. 
 
- the infected person is standing in the same room as the susceptible person, not 
shaking hands or making physical contact directly, only touching occasional shared 
surfaces such as door handles or objects on a supermarket shelf.   
 
- the infected person is sitting opposite the susceptible person, both making contact 
with the same table, but not directly with each other, perhaps fleeting contact with 
the same object such as condiment containers on a table or passing a 
book/leaflet/napkin   
 
- the infected person and susceptible person are both regularly touching the same 
items, such as if they were playing a board game, both typing at the same computer 
in close succession, or passing plates between each other at a meal.   
 
- the infected person and susceptible person are regularly and directly contacting 
each other, such as taking part in a contact sport, or dancing together.   
 
How would the length of time the infected person spent in the environment affect 
the proportional split of infectious virus that would likely travel along each of these 
four pathways? 
 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that any of 
the new variants of concern of SARS-CoV-2 may cause a different proportional split? 
 
In this next section, please consider how certain mitigations or conditions might 
affect the percentage of the virus that will actually reach the next node along the 
three pathways shown in the diagram. We will give you different scenarios and this 
time please type in the range of the percentage reduction of the amount of infectious 
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Mitigations  
Percentage decrease along each path (loss to 





Activity and mitigations 
 
Splits for each activity elicited 
virus that you think will reach the next node along each of these three pathways. 
(Path A: The hands of the infected person; Path B: The surfaces around the infected 
person; Path C: The hands of the susceptible person) if: 
 
- the infected person was in a well-ventilated space (such as room with the 
windows open)   
- the infected person were outdoors   
- the infected person was wearing a face covering 
- the infected person was behind a perspex screen 
- the infected person practised good respiratory hygiene 
- the infected person was wearing gloves 
- the infected person was in the space for half as long 
 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that the new 
variant of SARS-CoV2 may behave differently in any way in this pathway? 
 
In this section we would like you to tell us your estimates for the proportions of the 
infectious virus present on the hands of an infected person that would likely be 
passed on in a viable form to surrounding surfaces (path A), compared with those 
that might be transferred directly to the hands of another person (path B) under a 
number of different scenarios. Please assume at first that there are no mitigations 
such as hand washing and that the encounters are long enough to reach a steady 
state in terms of virus transfer. 
 
- the infected person is standing in the same room as the susceptible person, not 
shaking hands or making physical contact directly, only touching occasional shared 
surfaces such as door handles or objects on a supermarket shelf.   
 
- the infected person is sitting opposite the susceptible person, both making contact 
with the same table, but not directly with each other, perhaps fleeting contact with 
BMJ Publishing Group Limited (BMJ) disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any reliance
Supplemental material placed on this supplemental material which has been supplied by the author(s) BMJ Open
 doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869:e050869. 11 2021;BMJ Open, et al. Freeman ALJ
Percentage decrease along each path (loss to 
environment) elicited for mitigations 
 
the same object such as condiment containers on a table or passing a 
book/leaflet/napkin   
 
- the infected person and susceptible person are both regularly touching the same 
items, such as if they were playing a board game, both typing at the same computer 
in close succession, or passing plates between each other at a meal.   
 
- the infected person and susceptible person are regularly and directly contacting 
each other, such as taking part in a contact sport, or dancing together.   
    
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that any of 
the new variants of concern of SARS-CoV-2 may behave differently in any way in this 
pathway? 
 
Now we would like to hear your opinions on how much mitigations might reduce the 
viral spread along these two pathways. What percentage decrease of 
viable infectious virus that would likely be passed on via path A (onto surfaces 
touched by the infected person) and path B (directly onto the hands of another 
person) do you think there would be if:   
 
- the infected person used good hand hygiene such as alcohol hand sanitiser before 
entering the scenario.   
 
- the infected person put on clean gloves before entering the scenario.   
 
- the infected person were in the scenario for only half the time 
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Activity and mitigations 
 
Splits for each activity elicited 
Percentage decrease along each path (loss to 
environment) elicited for mitigations 
 
In this section we want to hear your estimates for how much virus would likely be 
transferred between contaminated surfaces and the hands of a susceptible person in 
various scenarios. The percentage of viable infectious virus that would likely be 
transferred from all contaminated surfaces to the hands of a susceptible person who 
touches it if:  
 
- the surface is a wooden table or desk that the susceptible person is sharing with the 
infected person (no mitigations like cleaning).   
 
- the surface is ceramic or metal condiments, handrail, touch screen or plates being 
shared with the susceptible person (no mitigations like gloves).   
 
- the surface is paper or card such as envelopes, leaflets or cardboard packages in a 
supermarket being shared with the susceptible person (no mitigations like gloves).   
 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that any of 
the new variants of concern of SARS-CoV-2 may behave differently in any way in this 
pathway? 
 
Now, thinking about how much various mitigation activities might decrease viral 
transmission: please tell us the percentage reduction of viable infectious virus that 
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would likely be passed from a contaminated surface to the hands of a susceptible 
person who touches it 
 
- if the surface is cleaned thoroughly with an alcohol-based cleaning product 
 
- if the susceptible person were wearing gloves (N.B. We mean onto the surface of the 
gloves) 
 
- the susceptible person practised good hand hygiene 
 
We propose to treat the transmission of virus from the hands of a susceptible person 
back to a surface (after initial contamination) in the same way as initial virus 
transmission from an infected person to a surface. If there are any reasons not to do 
this, please let us know. 
 
 
Pathway 5: factors that affect the direct transmission 
of the virus from large droplets (>100 micrometres) 
directly to an uninfected person  
  
Environment and mitigation losses only 
In this section we would like to hear your opinions on how much virus is likely to be 
transmitted from large droplets in the air to a susceptible person's mucous 
membranes under different conditions. The percentage of viable infectious 
virus contained in large droplets in the exhaled air from an infected person that 
would likely directly reach the mucous membranes of a susceptible person: 
 
- who was within 2m of the infected person in an unventilated room.   
- who was further than 2m from the infected person in an unventilated room.   
- closer than 2m in a well-ventilated room   
- further than 2m in a well-ventilated room   
- closer than 2m outdoors   
- further than 2m outdoors   
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(elicited as percentage not lost) We now ask you to consider potential mitigations. By how much do you think the 
amount of infectious virus received by someone via large droplets in the air will be 
reduced if: 
 
- They are wearing a home-made cotton face covering. 
- They are wearing a ‘surgical’ face mask. 
- They are wearing a FFP3 or equivalent face mask  
- They are behind a perspex screen. 
- They are wearing a plastic face visor 
 
 
Pathway 6: factors that affect the transmission of the 
virus from an uninfected person's hands to parts of 
their body where the virus could then infect them  
 
Environment and mitigation losses only (I couldn’t 
think of any different environments so it’s just the 
one baseline one) 
(elicited as percentage not lost) 
In this section we would like to hear your opinions on how much virus is likely to be 
transmitted from a susceptible person's hands to their mucous membranes under 
different conditions. We'll ask firstly about under normal conditions, and then with 
some potential mitigations in place.   
 
What percentage of infectious virus from someone's hand will reach their mucous 
membranes a viable form, with no mitigations in place? 
 
Is there any evidence for or against, or reason to believe or not believe, that the new 
variant of SARS-CoV-2 may behave differently in any way in this pathway? Please give 
as much detail as you can for your opinion. 
 
By what percentage do you think the amount of viable infectious virus travelling from 
someone's hand to their mucous membranes will be reduced if: 
 
- they are wearing a face covering  
- they are wearing gloves  
- they are wearing a face shield  
- they practise good hand hygiene 
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We are assuming that 'not touching your face' will reduce this pathway to zero. 
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Supplementary information 2: forest plots of participants’ estimates of variables in 
round 1 
 
Pathway 1: factors that affect the amount of virus exhaled by an infected person 
 
Compared to an infected person with a normal respiratory rate, not speaking (considered to 
be 100%), the percentage range of infectious virus produced by someone with normal 
respiratory rate who was: 
 




speaking loudly such as in a classroom, 
theatre or lecture
coughing singing 
exercising eating   




BMJ Publishing Group Limited (BMJ) disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any reliance
Supplemental material placed on this supplemental material which has been supplied by the author(s) BMJ Open
 doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869:e050869. 11 2021;BMJ Open, et al. Freeman ALJ
Pathway 2: factors that affect the amount of virus put out into the environment in the form 
of aerosols, small droplets & large droplets 
 
The percentage range of infectious virus split between path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) and path C (large droplets, over 100 
micrometres) for someone who was: 
 
speaking at average volume (i.e. not 
projecting their voice) 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
speaking loudly such as in a classroom, theatre 
or lecture 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
coughing 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
singing 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
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exercising 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
eating 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
silent  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
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The percentage range of infectious virus split between each pathway if… 
 
the infected person is wearing a home-
made cotton face covering 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
the infected person is wearing a simple 
‘surgical’ face mask 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
 
path C (large droplets, over 100 micrometres) 
 
the infected person is wearing a FFP3 face 
mask or similar 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
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Pathway 3: factors that affect the amount of virus that can be inhaled or inspired from the 
environment 
 
Of that starting volume of infectious virus (now considered 100%), the ranges of 
the percentage of infectious virus that would reach a susceptible person in viable 
form from aerosols (<10 micrometres) (path A) and small droplets (10-100 micrometres) 
(path B) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m from each other in: 
 
a small, unventilated room together 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a small, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, unventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
outdoors 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
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If the infected person and susceptible person were less then 2m from each other in: 
 
 
a small, unventilated room together 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a small, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, unventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
outdoors 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
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If the infected person and susceptible person were more then 2m from each other in: 
 
 
a small, unventilated room together 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a small, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, unventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
a large, ventilated room  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
outdoors 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
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The amount of infectious virus received by the susceptible person would likely be reduced 
along path A (aerosols, <10 micrometres) or path B (small droplets, 10-100 micrometres) if: 
 
they are wearing a home-made cotton face 
covering  
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
they are wearing a ‘surgical’ mask 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
they are wearing a FFP3 mask or similar 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
they are wearing a plastic face visor 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
 
path B (small droplets 10-100 micrometres) 
 
they are sitting behind a perspex screen? 
path A (aerosols <10 micrometres) 
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Pathway 4: factors that affect the transmission of the virus from large droplets (>100 
micrometres) to surfaces and then via hands and surface contamination.  
 
The proportions of the amount of infectious virus present in large droplets (>100 
micrometres) produced during respiration by an infected person that would likely be passed 
on to the hands of the infected person (path A), onto all surrounding surfaces (path B), or 
directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C), compared with those remaining in 
the air (path D), in a range of different scenarios: 
 
Not shaking hands or making physical 
contact directly, only touching occasional 
shared surfaces such as door handles or 





onto the hands of the infected person (path A) 
 
onto all surrounding surfaces (path B) 
 
directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C)  
 
















The infected person is sitting opposite the 
susceptible person, both making contact 
with the same table, but not directly with 
each other, perhaps fleeting contact with 
the same object such as condiment 
containers on a table or passing a 
book/leaflet/napkin   
 
onto the hands of the infected person (path A) 
 
onto all surrounding surfaces (path B) 
 
directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C)  
 
compared with those remaining in the air (path D) 
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The infected person and susceptible 
person are both regularly touching the 
same items, such as if they were playing a 
board game, both typing at the same 
computer in close succession, or passing 
plates between each other at a meal.   
 
onto the hands of the infected person (path A) 
 
onto all surrounding surfaces (path B) 
 
directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C)  
 
compared with those remaining in the air (path D) 
 
The infected person and susceptible person 
are regularly and directly contacting each 
other, such as taking part in a contact sport, 




onto the hands of the infected person (path A) 
 
onto all surrounding surfaces (path B) 
 
directly onto the hands of a susceptible person (path C)  
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The range of the percentage reduction of the amount of infectious virus will reach the next 
node along each of these three pathways. (Path A: The hands of the infected person; Path B: 
The surfaces around the infected person; Path C: The hands of the susceptible person) if: 
 
the infected person was in a well-
ventilated space (such as room with the 
windows open)   
Path A: The hands of the infected person 
 
Path B: The surfaces around the infected person 
 
Path C: The hands of the susceptible person 
 
the infected person were outdoors   
 
 
Path A: The hands of the infected person 
 
Path B: The surfaces around the infected person 
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Estimates for the proportions of the infectious virus present on the hands of an infected 
person that would likely be passed on in a viable form to surrounding surfaces (path A), 
compared with those that might be transferred directly to the hands of another person 
(path B) if there were no mitigations, and the encounters were long enough to reach steady 
state of virus transfer in a range of situations: 
 
Not shaking hands or making physical 
contact directly, only touching occasional 
shared surfaces such as door handles or 




surrounding surfaces (path A) 
 
directly to the hands of another person (path B) 
 
The infected person is sitting opposite the 
susceptible person, both making contact 
with the same table, but not directly with 
each other, perhaps fleeting contact with 
the same object such as condiment 
containers on a table or passing a 
book/leaflet/napkin.   
surrounding surfaces (path A) 
 
directly to the hands of another person (path B) 
 
 
The infected person and susceptible person 
are both regularly touching the same items, 
such as if they were playing a board game, 
both typing at the same computer in close 
succession, or passing plates between each 
other at a meal.   
surrounding surfaces (path A) 
 
directly to the hands of another person (path B) 
 
 
The infected person and susceptible 
person are regularly and directly 
contacting each other, such as taking part 
in a contact sport, or dancing together.   
 
 
surrounding surfaces (path A) 
 
 
directly to the hands of another person (path B) 
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Percentage decrease of viable infectious virus that would likely be passed on via path A 
(onto surfaces touched by the infected person) and path B (directly onto the hands of 
another person) if:   
 
..the infected person used good hand 
hygiene such as alcohol hand sanitiser 
before entering the scenario.   
 
surrounding surfaces (path A) 
 
directly to the hands of another person (path B) 
 
…the infected person put on clean gloves 
before entering the scenario.   
 
 
surrounding surfaces (path A) 
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The percentage of viable infectious virus that would likely be transferred from all 
contaminated surfaces to the hands of a susceptible person who touches it if:  
 
…the surface is a wooden table or desk that 
the susceptible person is sharing with the 
infected person (no mitigations like cleaning) 
 
…the surface is ceramic or metal 
condiments, handrail, touch screen or 
plates being shared with the susceptible 
person (no mitigations like gloves) 
 
…the surface is paper or card such as 
envelopes, leaflets or cardboard packages in 
a supermarket being shared with the 






percentage reduction of viable infectious virus that would likely be passed from a 
contaminated surface to the hands of a susceptible person who touches it if: 
 
…the surface is cleaned thoroughly with an 
alcohol-based cleaning product 
 
 
…if the susceptible person were wearing 
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Pathway 5: factors that affect the direct transmission of the virus from large droplets (>100 
micrometres) directly to an uninfected person  
 
The percentage of viable infectious virus contained in large droplets in the exhaled air 
from an infected person that would likely directly reach the mucous membranes of a 
susceptible person: 
 
…who was within 2m of the infected person 
in an unventilated room 
 
…who was further than 2m from the 
infected person in an unventilated room 
 
…closer than 2m in a well-ventilated room  
  
(no responses mean participants had selected that they thought 
the results would not differ from above) 
…further than 2m in a well-ventilated room  
(no responses mean participants had selected that they thought 
the results would not differ from above)  
…closer than 2m outdoors   
 
(no responses mean participants had selected that they thought 
the results would not differ from above) 
…further than 2m outdoors   
 
 
The percentage reduction in the amount of infectious virus received by someone via large 
droplets in the air if: 
 
…they are wearing a home-made cotton 
face covering 
 
…they are wearing a disposable ‘surgical’ 
face mask 
 
…they are wearing a FFP3 or equivalent face 
mask  
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Pathway 6: factors that affect the transmission of the virus from an uninfected person's 
hands to parts of their body where the virus could then infect them   
 
Percentage of infectious virus from someone's hand that will reach their mucous 




The percentage reduction in the amount of viable infectious virus travelling from someone's 
hand to their mucous membranes if: 
 
…they are wearing a face covering  
 
…they are wearing gloves  
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Supplementary information 4: Elicitation round 2 responses 
 
In these figures the range presented to participants in round 2 (derived from round 1 
responses) is shown in orange. The top graph shows each individuals’ percentage estimates 
of the likelihood of the true value lying below, within and above the range. The middle 
graph shows an average of the individual distributions. The bottom graph shows that 
average distribution as a cumulative probability graph (blue) and the derived median and 




Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious SARS-CoV-2 produced by an infected 





Supplementary Figure 1: Responses from participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols when 
the infected person was silent. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles 
(10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 2: Responses from the participant who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the 
particle size spectrum when the infected person was silent. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 3: Responses from the participant who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols 
when the infected person was speaking normally. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 4: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the 
particle size spectrum when the infected person was speaking normally. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols 
(<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 5: Responses from the participant who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols 
when the infected person was talking loudly. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) 
small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 6: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the particle 
size spectrum when the infected person was talking loudly. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) 
small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 7: Responses from the participant who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via large 
particles when the infected person was talking loudly. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 8: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the 
particle size spectrum when the infected person was coughing. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 9: Responses from the participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via large particles 
when the infected person was coughing. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 10: Responses from the participant who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols when 
the infected person was singing. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-
100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 11: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across 
the particle size spectrum when the infected person was singing. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 12: Responses from the participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via large particles 
when the infected person was singing. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles 
(10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 13: Responses from the participant who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols when 
the infected person was exercising. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles 
(10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 14: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the 
particle size spectrum when the infected person was exercising. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 15: Responses from the participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via large 
particles when the infected person was exercising. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 16: Responses from the participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via aerosols when 
the infected person was eating. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles 
(10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 17: Responses from participants who thought the distribution of virus would be more evenly spread across the 
particle size spectrum when the infected person was eating. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Supplementary Figure 18: Responses from the participants who thought the majority of virus would be transmitted via large particles 
when the infected person was exercising. Estimates for the amount of virus transmitted via A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres), C) large particles (>100 micrometres) 
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Mitigation: Home-made face covering 
 
Supplementary Figure 19: Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction that a home-made cotton face covering 
would likely cause to the amount of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), and C) large 
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Supplementary Figure 20: Participants’ estimates of the percentage distributions of infections virus in the different size 
fractions of respiratory air from an infected person who was wearing a home-made cotton face covering (taking into 
account both initial distribution and then the effect of the mitigation). 
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Mitigation: ‘surgical’ face mask 
 
Supplementary Figure 21: Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction that a disposable ‘surgical’ face mask would 
likely cause to the amount of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), and C) large particles 
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Supplementary Figure 22: Participants’ estimates of the percentage distributions of infections virus in the different size fractions of respiratory 
air from an infected person who was wearing a disposable ‘surgical’ face mask covering (taking into account both initial distribution and  then 
the effect of the mitigation). 
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Mitigation: FFP3 mask or similar 
 
Supplementary Figure 23: Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction that a FFP3 or similar face mask would likely 
cause to the amount of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), and C) large particles (>100 
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Mitigation: face visor 
 
Supplementary Figure 24: Participants' estimates of the percentage reduction that a plastic face visor would likely cause to 
the amount of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres), B) small particles (10-100 micrometres), and C) large particles (>100 
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Supplementary Figure 25: Participants’ estimates of the percentage distributions of infections virus in the different size fractions of respiratory 
air from an infected person who was wearing a disposable ‘surgical’ face mask covering (taking into account both initial distribution and then 
the effect of the mitigation). 
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Supplementary information 5: Elicitation round 2 responses: Pathway 
3 
 
In these figures the range presented to participants in round 2 (derived from round 1 
responses) is shown in orange. The top graph shows each individuals’ percentage estimates 
of the likelihood of the true value lying below, within and above the range. The middle 
graph shows an average of the individual distributions. The bottom graph shows that 
average distribution as a cumulative probability graph (blue) and the derived median and 
95% confidence intervals in green. 
 
 
Pathway 3: Participants' estimates of the percentage of infectious SARS-CoV-2 that can be 
inhaled or inspired from the environment by a susceptible person.  
 
Small, unventilated room, 2m apart 
Supplementary Figure 1: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) 
and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart in a small, 
unventilated room: the estimates of the participant who thought the loss to aerosols would be around half 
Supplementary Figure 2: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart in a 
small, unventilated room: the participants who thought the loss to aerosols would more than half 
A) B) 
A) B) 
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Small, ventilated room, 2m apart 
  
Supplementary Figure 3: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m 
apart in a small, ventilated room. One participant fell into the camp of those thought the loss for small droplets 
would be around 50%, whilst the rest indicated that they thought it would be higher (but some indicated it would be 
lower than those in round 1 thought) 
A) 
B) 
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Large, unventilated room, 2m apart 
  
a) 
Supplementary Figure 4: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of small particles (10-100 
micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart in a large, unventilated room: the estimates of the 
participants who thought the loss would be a) Less than half, b) around half c) more than half 
Supplementary Figure 5: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of aerosols (<10 micrometres) and 
if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart in a large, unventilated room: the estimates of the participants 
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Large, ventilated room, 2m apart 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 6: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and 
b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart in a large, ventilated room. 
One participant fell into the cap of those who thought the loss of small particles might be more like half (although their 
percentages around this were uninformative, indicating very broad uncertainties) 
A) 
B) 
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Outdoors, 2m apart 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 7: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 
micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were 2m apart 
outdoors 
A) B) 
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Supplementary Figure 8: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) 
small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart in a small, unventilated 
room. One participant selected that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be less than 50% but then gave 100% 
probability of it being higher than the small range elicited from round 1. 
A) 
B) 
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Supplementary Figure 9: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small particles 
(10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart in a small, ventilated room. One participant selected 
that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be less than 50%, but above the small range elicited in round 1 
A) 
B) 
BMJ Publishing Group Limited (BMJ) disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any reliance
Supplemental material placed on this supplemental material which has been supplied by the author(s) BMJ Open
 doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869:e050869. 11 2021;BMJ Open, et al. Freeman ALJ
Large, unventilated room, further than 2m 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 10: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) 
and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart in a large, 
unventilated room. One participant selected that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be less than 50%, 
but above the small range elicited in round 1 
A) 
B) 
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Large, ventilated room, further than 2m 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 11: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart in a large, ventilated room. One 
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Outdoors, further than 2m apart 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 12: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart, outside. 
A) B) 
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Supplementary Figure 11: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) 
small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were closer than 2m  in a small, unventilated 
room. One participant selected that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be greater than 50%. 
A) 
B) 
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Supplementary Figure 12: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) 
small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart in a small, unventilated 
room. Two participants selected that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be less than 50%, but above the small 
range elicited in round 1 
A) 
B) 
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Large, unventilated room, closer than 2m 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 13: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) 
and b) small particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were closer than 2m in a large, 
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Large, ventilated room, closer than 2m 
 
  
Supplementary Figure 14: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were closer than 2m in a large, ventilated room. Two 
participant selected that they thought the percentage loss of small particles would be less than 50%, two greater. 
A) 
B) 
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Supplementary Figure 15: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small 
particles (10-100 micrometres) if the infected person and susceptible person were more than 2m apart, outside. One participant thought 
that the loss for small particles would be less than 50%. 
A) 
B) 
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Supplementary Figure 16: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 
micrometres) if the susceptible person were wearing a home-made cotton face covering. One participant thought that the loss for 
aerosols would be around 50%. 
A) 
B) 
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Supplementary Figure 17: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 
micrometres) if the susceptible person were wearing a disposable ‘surgical’ face mask. One participant thought that the loss for aerosols 
would be lower than 50%. 
A) 
B) 
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Mitigation: FFP3 face mask or similar 
 
Mitigation: plastic face visor 
 
Supplementary Figure 18: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 
micrometres) if the susceptible person were wearing a FFP3 face mask or similar.  
Supplementary Figure 18: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and b) small particles (10-100 
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Supplementary Figure 16: Participants’ estimates of the percentage loss of A) aerosols (<10 micrometres) and B) small particles (10-100 
micrometres) if the susceptible person behind a perspex screen. One participant thought that the loss for small particles would be above 
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Supplementary information 6: Elicitation round 2 responses: Pathway 
4 
 
In these figures the range presented to participants in round 2 (derived from round 1 
responses) is shown in orange. The top graph shows each individuals’ percentage estimates 
of the likelihood of the true value lying below, within and above the range. The middle 
graph shows an average of the individual distributions. The bottom graph shows that 
average distribution as a cumulative probability graph (blue) and the derived median and 




Participants' estimates of proportions of infectious SARS-CoV-2 produced by an infected 
person in large, airborne droplets (>100 micrometres) they expected to be transmitted 
along four possible paths (without any mitigations in place): 
 
Path A – directly onto the hands of the infected person 
Path B – onto all surrounding surfaces 
Path C – directly onto the hands of the susceptible person 
Path D – remaining in the air 
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Scenario 1: no direct contact 
The infected person is standing in the same room as the susceptible person, not shaking 
hands or making physical contact directly, only touching occasional shared surfaces such as 
door handles or objects on a supermarket shelf.   
 
Supplementary Figure 1:  Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from large 







A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands D: remaining airborne 
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Scenario 2: Shared table/desk 
The infected person is sitting opposite the susceptible person, both making contact with 
the same table, but not directly with each other, perhaps fleeting contact with the same 
object such as condiment containers on a table or passing a book/leaflet/napkin  
 
 
Supplementary Figure 2: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from large 







A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands D: remaining airborne 
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Scenario 3: Shared items 
The infected person and susceptible person are both regularly touching the same items, 
such as if they were playing a board game, both typing at the same computer in close 
succession, or passing plates between each other at a meal.   
 
Supplementary Figure 3: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from large 







A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands D: remaining airborne 
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Scenario 4: Direct contact 
The infected person and susceptible person are regularly and directly contacting each 
other, such as taking part in a contact sport, or dancing together.   
 
Supplementary Figure 4: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from large 







A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands D: remaining airborne 
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Mitigation 1:  ventilation 
Participants were asked, if the infected person was in a well-ventilated space (such as room 
with the windows open), by how much transmission of the virus would be reduced. 
 
Supplementary Figure 5: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of transfer of 






A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 2:  being outdoors 
Participants were asked, if the infected person was in a well-ventilated space (such as room 
with the windows open), by how much transmission of the virus would be reduced. 
 
Supplementary Figure 5: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of transfer of 






A: infected person’s hands B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 3: Infected person wearing a face covering 
Supplementary Figure 6: Participants' individual (blue) and pooled (green) estimates of the likely percentage reduction of 







A: infected person’s hands 
B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 4: Infected person behind a Perspex screen 
Supplementary Figure 8: Participants' individual (blue) and pooled (green) estimates of the likely percentage reduction of 







A: infected person’s hands 
B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 5: Infected person practising good respiratory hygiene 
Supplementary Figure 9: Participants' individual (blue) and pooled (green) estimates of the likely percentage reduction of 







A: infected person’s hands 
B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 6: Infected person wearing gloves 
Supplementary Figure 10: Participants' individual (blue) and pooled (green) estimates of the likely percentage reduction of 







A: infected person’s hands 
B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Mitigation 7: Infected person stays half the time in the scenario 
Supplementary Figure 11: Participants' individual (blue) and pooled (green) estimates of the likely percentage reduction of 







A: infected person’s hands 
B: surrounding surfaces 
C: susceptible person’s hands 
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Onwards transfer from hands - Scenario 1: no direct contact 
The infected person is standing in the same room as the susceptible person, not shaking 
hands or making physical contact directly, only touching occasional shared surfaces such as 
door handles or objects on a supermarket shelf.   
 
Supplementary Figure 32:  Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from 
contaminated hands transmitted via different routes when two individuals are in a shared room but with no direct contact  
 
 
Onwards transfer from hands - Scenario 2: Shared table/desk 
The infected person is sitting opposite the susceptible person, both making contact with 
the same table, but not directly with each other, perhaps fleeting contact with the same 
object such as condiment containers on a table or passing a book/leaflet/napkin  
 
Supplementary Figure 13: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from 




A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
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Onwards transfer from hands - Scenario 3: Shared items 
The infected person and susceptible person are both regularly touching the same items, 
such as if they were playing a board game, both typing at the same computer in close 
succession, or passing plates between each other at a meal.   
 
Supplementary Figure 14: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from 




Onwards transfer from hands - Scenario 4: Direct contact 
The infected person and susceptible person are regularly and directly contacting each 
other, such as taking part in a contact sport, or dancing together.   
 
Supplementary Figure 15: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage of infectious virus from 




A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
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Onwards transfer from hands – Mitigation 1: Hand hygiene 
The infected person used effective hand hygiene such as using alcohol hand sanitiser before 
entering the scenario  
 
Supplementary Figure 16: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of infectious virus 




Onwards transfer from hands – Mitigation 2: Gloves 
The infected person put on clean gloves before entering the scenario  
 
Supplementary Figure 17: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of infectious virus 
from contaminated hands transmitted via different routes when the infected person wears gloves: those who thought the 





A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
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Supplementary Figure 18: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of infectious virus 
from contaminated hands transmitted via different routes when the infected person wears gloves: those who thought the 





A: surrounding surfaces B: susceptible person’s hands 
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Onwards transfer from hands – Mitigation 3: Halving the time spent in the scenario 
 
Supplementary Figure 17: Participants' individual and pooled estimates of the likely percentage reduction of infectious virus 








A: surrounding surfaces 
B: susceptible person’s hands 
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Surface to hand transfer – Scenario 1: wooden table 
Participants were asked to estimate the amount of viable infectious virus that would likely 
be lost to the environment during transfer from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
susceptible person who touches it if the surface is a wooden table or desk that the 




Surface to hand transfer – Scenario 2: metal or ceramic 
Participants were asked to estimate the amount of viable infectious virus that would likely 
be lost to the environment during transfer from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
susceptible person who touches it if the surface is ceramic or metal condiments, handrail, 
touch screen or plates being shared with the susceptible person (no mitigations like gloves)  
 
Two participants thought that the range would likely be below 50%, and their range was 
elicited afresh (bottom graphs) 
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Surface to hand transfer – Scenario 3: paper or card 
Participants were asked to estimate the amount of viable infectious virus that would likely 
be lost to the environment during transfer from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
susceptible person who touches it if the surface is paper or card such as envelopes, leaflets 
or cardboard packages in a supermarket being shared with the susceptible person (no 
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Surface to hand transfer – Mitigation 1: surface cleaning 
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage reduction in the amount of viable 
infectious virus that would likely be passed from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
susceptible person who touches it if the surface is cleaned thoroughly with an alcohol-based 





Surface to hand transfer – Mitigation 2: wearing gloves 
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage reduction in the amount of viable 
infectious virus that would likely be passed from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
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Surface to hand transfer – Mitigation 2: hand hygiene 
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage reduction in the amount of viable 
infectious virus that would likely be passed from a contaminated surface to the hands of a 
susceptible person who touches it if the susceptible person were wearing gloves  
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Supplementary information 7: Elicitation round 2 responses: Pathway 
5 
 
In these figures the range presented to participants in round 2 (derived from round 1 
responses) is shown in orange. The top graph shows each individuals’ percentage estimates 
of the likelihood of the true value lying below, within and above the range. The middle 
graph shows an average of the individual distributions. The bottom graph shows that 
average distribution as a cumulative probability graph (blue) and the derived median and 




Participants' estimates of the percentage loss to the environment of infectious SARS-CoV-2 
produced by an infected person in large, airborne droplets (>100 micrometres) before 
reaching a susceptible person’s mucous membranes. 
 


















Supplementary Figure 1: Participants’ estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus carried in large (>100 
micrometres) airborne particles caused by a susceptible person wearing a home-made cotton face covering 
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Supplementary Figure 2: Participants’ estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus carried in large (>100 
micrometres) airborne particles caused by a susceptible person wearing a disposable ‘surgical’ face mask 
Supplementary Figure 3: Participants’ estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus carried in large (>100 micrometres) 
airborne particles caused by a susceptible person wearing a FFP3 or equivalent face mask 
BMJ Publishing Group Limited (BMJ) disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any reliance
Supplemental material placed on this supplemental material which has been supplied by the author(s) BMJ Open
 doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-050869:e050869. 11 2021;BMJ Open, et al. Freeman ALJ


















Supplementary Figure 4: Participants’ estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus carried in large (>100 
micrometres) airborne particles caused by a susceptible person wearing face visor. Because this variable was elicited first in 
Round 2, the blue plot shows individual participants’ estimated ranges, and the green plot is an average of those. 
Supplementary Figure 5: Participants’ estimates of the percentage reduction of infectious virus carried in large (>100 
micrometres) airborne particles caused by a susceptible person being behind a Perspex screen 
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